• CRISIS GROUP: What Can the U.S. Do in Iraq? • POLICY REVIEW: Iraq Without a Plan • DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD: Transition to and from Hostilities • MEDACT: Enduring Effects of War: Health in Iraq 2004 • IDP PROJECT: Iraq: continued insecurity adds to vulnerability of over 1m IDPs • HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: Iraq: State of the Evidence • BASIC: A Fistful of Contractors • CRISIS GROUP: Reconstructing Iraq • RIIA: Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst? • FOREIGN AFFAIRS: What Went Wrong in Iraq • RAND: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq • BROOKINGS: Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP What Can the US Do in Iraq? December 2004 Iraqi hostility, wider and deeper rooted than the U.S. has acknowledged, means Washington's policy there can no longer achieve its original aims. Soaring resentment feeds the insurgency, making the transition process a source of, not the solution to, the legitimacy deficit. Pursuit of the impossible has become an obstacle to achieving the possible: a stable government Iraqis consider credible, representative, the embodiment of national interests, and capable of addressing their needs. Washington can still salvage the situation if it recognises new realities and adopts a dual disengagement course: gradual U.S. political and military disengagement from Iraq and, equally important, clear Iraqi political disengagement from the U.S. U.S. and Iraqi authorities should agree on and articulate where they want to be by late 2005, when the transitional process is to end, particularly the extent of the political and any military roles the U.S. will still play. Continue Reading More from the International Crisis Group POLICY REVIEW ONLINE Iraq Without a Plan December 2004 The post-invasion phase of the Iraq mission has been the least well-planned American military mission since Somalia in 1993, if not Lebanon in 1983, and its consequences for the nation have been far worse than any set of military mistakes since Vietnam. The U.S. armed forces simply were not prepared for the core task that the United States needed to perform when it destroyed Iraq’s existing government — to provide security, always the first responsibility of any sovereign government or occupier. Continue reading More from Policy Review Online DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD Transition to and from Hostilities December 2004 The U.S. military is poorly prepared to conduct post-combat stabilization operations, the Defense Science Board (DSB) observes in this report. The DSB, composed of approximately 40 members, advises the Pentagon on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special interest to the Department of Defense. Continue reading More from the Defense Science Board MEDACT Enduring Effects of War: Health in Iraq 2004 November 2004 This evidence-based report analyzes, from a public health perspective, the impact of the 2003 war in Iraq on health, the health system, and relief and reconstruction. Health is harmed by conflict-related damage to health-sustaining infrastructure and to the health system, as well as the corrosive effects of conflict-related factors such as poverty, unemployment, disrupted education and low morale. The effects of the war must be measured not only by death and injuries due to weaponry, but by the longer-term, enduring suffering. The report describes the deaths and injuries attributable to conflict and violence, and the current pattern of mental and physical illness. It gives an overview of the Iraqi health care system and barriers to good health care, including problems with the health-sustaining infrastructure. It analyzes the challenges of building a new health system freely available to all and based on primary health care principles. Continue reading More from Medact GLOBAL IDP PROJECT Iraq: continued insecurity adds to vulnerability of over 1 million IDPs November 2004 More than a million people remain internally displaced in Iraq today, though figures are uncertain given the poor security in the country. The majority of internally displaced people (IDPs) were forcibly displaced under the previous regime, which targeted communities perceived to be in political opposition as well as using forcible displacement as one of its tactics to gain control of resource-rich areas. Prior to the United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that led to the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it is estimated that some 800,000 people were displaced in the north, mainly Kurds, but also Assyrians and Turkomen. In the south and centre, between 100,000 and 200,000 Marsh Arabs and at least 25,000 Arab Shi’ites were displaced. At present the largest new population displacements are the result of fighting between the US-led Coalition Forces and Iraqi insurgents, particularly in and around Fallujah and Najaf. Continue reading More from Global IDP Project HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Iraq: State of the Evidence November 2004 After more than thirty-five years of Ba‘thist rule, Saddam Hussein and a number of other former Iraqi government officials responsible for perpetrating the most heinous crimes under international law—crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes—are about to be tried for their alleged crimes. This is the moment that Iraqis across the country, as well as many living abroad, have been waiting for and never thought they would see. This report provides an in-depth account of what has happened to key archival and forensic evidence since the ouster of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. The study is based on research conducted in Baghdad and the four northern governorates of Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil, and Sulaimaniyya in February 2004, as well as earlier research conducted between April and June 2003 on mass graves in the governorates of Basra, Diyala, al-Hilla, al-Diwaniyya (al-Qadissiyya), al-‘Anbar, Karbala’, and al-Najaf. Continue reading More from Human Rights Watch BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq October 2004 Since the first civilian contractors started operating in Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion, there has been growing public scrutiny of their activities. While most of the attention has been paid to the activities of contractors doing reconstruction work such as Halliburton, Parsons, Fluor, growing attention and concern has been paid to the operations of those private military and security firms (herein referred as Private Military Companies, or PMCs) who provide security for such firms, as well as for Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) workers, nongovernmental organizations, and western media. This BASIC Report provides an analysis of the PMC activities in Iraq over the past year, including their legal status and their operations; it also looks at issues of concern and makes a number of recommendations. Continue reading More from the British American Security Information Council INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP Reconstructing Iraq September 2004 Iraq desperately needs an economic recovery strategy to escape its vicious circle of hardship, discontent and violence. The economy suffers not only from a crushing legacy of Baathist misrule, war, and sanctions, but also from the ill-prepared, misdirected performance of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The occupation forces came mostly unprepared. What strategy they did have involved little Iraqi input, was shaped by ideology, and was repeatedly made subject to Washington's shifting deadlines, not local needs. The Interim Government, in partnership with the international community, must devise ways to produce immediate material improvement and set the stage for longer-term rebuilding. Until living conditions improve, nascent Iraqi institutions will continue to lose credibility and the insurgency to gain momentum. Continue reading More from the International Crisis Group ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst? September 2004 There are three possible scenarios for the future of Iraq. The most probable scenario is that Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish factions will fail to cohere under the transitional governments, leading to fragmentation and civil war, according this report by the RIIA. The hand over will lead to three likely scenarios: (1) If the Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd factions fail to adhere to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), Iraq could fragment or descend into civil war; (2) If the transitional government, backed up by a supportive US presence, can assert control, Iraq may well hold together; (3) A Regional Remake could overtake the other two scenarios if the dynamics unleashed by Shi’a and Kurdish assertiveness trigger repercussions in neighbouring states. Continue reading More from the Royal Institute of International Affairs FOREIGN AFFAIRS What Went Wrong in Iraq September 2004 Although the early U.S. blunders in the occupation of Iraq are well known, their consequences are just now becoming clear. The Bush administration was never willing to commit the resources necessary to secure the country and did not make the most of the resources it had. U.S. officials did get a number of things right, but they never understood-or even listened to-the country they were seeking to rebuild. As a result, the democratic future of Iraq now hangs in the balance. Continue reading More from Foreign Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations RAND CORPORATION Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq June 2004 For 50 years, the United States has had ill-fated experiences in effectively fighting insurgencies. In counterinsurgency terms, Vietnam and Iraq form two legs of a historically fraught triangle — with El Salvador providing the connecting leg. In light of this history, the author analyzes where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements. Continue reading More from the RAND Corporation BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq Updated every Monday, Wednesday and Friday The Iraq Index is a statistical compilation of economic and security data. This resource will provide updated information on various criteria, including crime, telephone and water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil production, and coalition troop strength. The index is designed to quantify the rebuilding efforts and offer an objective set of criteria for benchmarking performance. It is the first in-depth, non-partisan assessment of American efforts in Iraq, and is based primarily on U.S. government information. Although measurements of progress in any nation-building effort can never be reduced to purely quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate. Continue reading More from the Brookings Institution Compiled by Robert Hartfiel Human Security Research is produced by the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC. The Human Security Centre produces the annual Human Security Report and is funded by the governments of Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For more information on human security visit the Human Security Gateway, an online research and information database that contains a broad range of human security-related resources. To subscribe to Human Security Research,send an email to human.security@ubc.ca with 'subscribe hs-research' in the subject field. 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