	In Focus: Terrorism	31 October 2008

	Over the past year a reassessment of the threat posed by al-Qaeda has been underway with analysts pointing to declining public support, internal divisions and the effective defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq as signs the loose-knit Islamist terror movement is in decline. Others point to the growing Islamist strength in Afghanistan and Pakistan as evidence the the movement remains a major threat. This special issue of Human Security Research contains both viewpoints and an extended discussion of the tensions between the pursuit of counter-terror operations and the respect for human rights.

	What's New in Human Security Research :

• AL-QAEDA: Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare
• JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: Miscarriages of Justice and Exceptional Procedures
• COUNTERTERRORISM: The Strategy of Containment in Fighting Terrorism
• INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
• UNITED STATES: Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: A Changing Landscape
• ARMED CONFLICT: The Hollow Jihad: The Unrestricted Nature of Al-Qaeda's War
• HUMAN RIGHTS: The Civil Liberties Implications Of Counterterrorism Policies
• AL-QAEDA: Seven Years Later: The Jihadist International
• SAUDI ARABIA: "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare
• UNITED NATIONS: Security and Human Rights: Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations
• COUNTERTERRORISM: The Path to a Counterterrorism Doctrine
• LATIN AMERICA and CARRIBEAN: Implementing Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Region

AL-QAEDA
Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare
RAND Corporation
According to the latest thinking, al-Qaeda is now more important as an ideology than an organization, as a network than a hierarchy, and as a movement than a group. It is increasingly amorphous, although initially it seemed tightly formed. Osama bin Laden's core group may even be too weakened to matter very much in orchestrating specific operations. These changes represent a considerable evolution for al-Qaeda as well as for expert thinking about it. Initially – before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington – analysts wondered whether this mysterious organization was structured like a corporation, a venture capital firm, a franchise operation, a foundation, a social or organizational network – or all of these. Today, now that al-Qaeda has more affiliates, the network and franchise concepts remain in play, but the emphasis is on al-Qaeda's evolution into a decentralized, amorphous ideological movement for global jihad. Since so little about al-Qaeda's organization is fixed, counterterrorism analysts and strategists have to be ready to adapt their views to shifting realities and prospects. For example, a major new strike on American soil directed by bin Laden might jar analysts back to a belief that al-Qaeda's core remains (or has recovered as) a strong, central unit with an effective capacity for command and control.
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JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Miscarriages of Justice and Exceptional Procedures in the "War against Terrorism"
The Centre for European Policy Studies
The attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 have given new urgency to the call for political cooperation. With the fight against terrorism having been elevated to the highest priority and 'terrorism' presented as a threat to all democracies, the discourses of democratic solidarity against terrorism and of national insecurity have become very clear. Furthermore, they have emerged as common discourses to invoke a 'state of exception' and to suspend the rule of law, which may also include derogations of international commitments. It has been widely accepted among political actors that 'necessity' knows no law and that individual rights to liberty are trumped by the collective right to security. The 'war against terrorism' is certainly not an American invention (O'Connor & Rumann, 2003; Guittet, 2004). Indeed, the excesses and failures of anti-terrorist policies were already a European concern prior to the 9/11 attacks, as was the ensuing common perception of a transatlantic rift in the debate on the 'necessary sacrifice' of liberties for the sake of national and international security. In the post-9/11 period, political actors have sought to justify reliance on emergency measures adopted under exceptional procedures in the fight against political violence. How then does the judiciary respond to the demand to exceed the law in the name of collective security? What are the consequences in terms of rendering justice and especially in relation to the miscarriage of justice?.
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COUNTERTERRORISM
The Strategy of Containment in Fighting Terrorism
Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict
The current U.S. National Security Strategy for fighting the war against terrorism is under attack as a policy that is unsustainable, unilateral and a marked departure from past U.S. principles. It calls for an open-ended war against terrorism that continues to be costly to the United States in both blood and treasure. Although the doctrine calls for the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world, it is perceived as being largely words with no action, and when action is called for, it is through force. To win the fight against terrorism an alternative strategy is needed. A strategy that is sustainable and can be supported at home and abroad—the strategy of containment. It is a strategy that succeeded in winning the Cold War and is capable of reclaiming America's once high international stature. It is a sensible policy that relies on diplomacy, economic incentives, respect for international institutions and stresses the importance of allies for its success. However, not all aspects of the strategy of containment implemented during the Cold War will transfer to today's war on terrorism. This paper presents the tenets of containment strategy. It evaluates its past application against the Soviet Union and the future challenges it faces in its application to terrorist organizations. Although the challenges are many, this paper argues that containment is a viable alternative to current U.S. policy and will help regain the country's tradition of high moral standing.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
Since 11 September 2001, terrorism and the reaction to it by many governments and intergovernmental bodies, including the United Nations, have had an increasing impact on civil society. For their part, nongovernmental and other civil society organizations (CSOs)1 have played a critical role in encouraging governments and the United Nations to calibrate their response to terrorism by working to be effective against those who mean harm without eroding human rights and the rule of law. In 2006, with that challenge in mind, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed to a global strategy that outlines a holistic approach to countering terrorism and calls for the collective effort of an array of stakeholders, including civil society, to implement it. CSOs can help to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable peoples, including victims of terrorism, and provide a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances. They have important roles to play in activism, education, research, oversight, and even as potential assistance and service providers. They can also play a critical role in ensuring that counterterrorism measures (CTMs) respect human rights and the rule of law, and help generate awareness of a range of other Strategy-related issues. CSOs are undertaking an array of activities that both directly and indirectly contribute to implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN Strategy), but often with little or no acknowledgement that those efforts contribute to implementation of the Strategy or even combating terrorism generally.
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UNITED STATES
Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: A Changing Landscape
The Washington Institute on Near East Policy
At the time of the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda was a centralized, hierarchical organization that directed international terrorist operations from its base in Afghanistan. By 2004, al-Qaeda appeared to be in disarray, with its capabilities dramatically diminished. In fact, the State Department's annual terrorism report that year assessed that al-Qaeda had been 'weakened operationally' and that the United States and its allies had degraded the group's leadership abilities and depleted its operational ranks. While al-Qaeda remained focused on attacking U.S. interests, the report noted that its ability to conduct large-scale attacks had been greatly reduced. The growing 'grassroots' movement of terrorist networks and cells, inspired by al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden but with no direct ties to them, were thought to be the emerging threat. That picture has changed substantially over the past few years, as al-Qaeda's center has grown stronger. Charles Allen observed that although al-Qaeda was on its 'back foot' from 2004 to 2007, it has now 'regained its equilibrium.' Michael Leiter echoed this sentiment, warning, 'I regret to say that the al-Qaeda threat still looms large.' Donald Kerr offered a similar assessment: 'Al-Qaeda remains the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States at home and abroad.' There are several reasons, in Dr. Kerr's view, why al-Qaeda continues to pose such a serious threat to the United States. In particular, the group has 'retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including its top leadership, operational lieutenants, and a de facto safe haven in…the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [of Pakistan] to train and deploy operatives for attacks in the West.'
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ARMED CONFLICT
The Hollow Jihad: The Unrestricted Nature of Al-Qaeda's War
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies // Nanyang Technological University
The heretical nature of Al-Qaeda's understanding of jihad is in its loose interpretation of this religious principle. It is not rooted in the tradition of early Muslim scholars and goes against the spirit of the shari'ah or Islamic law. Accordingly, their 'jihad' defies any logic, reason, religion and convention--and thus falls hollow. Al-Qaeda's notion of unrestricted jihad can be seen in three major areas: zone of operation; target group; and type of combatants deployed. Like other traditions, Islam recognises the destructive nature of war and seeks to restrict it, contrary to Al-Qaeda's approach. Although there is nothing directly equivalent to the 'just war' theory in Islam, the majority of scholars on Islam recognises the existence of rules of war that do not support the idea of jihad as an unrestricted form of warfare. The permissiveness of Al-Qaeda's jihad departs not only from the original spirit of the religion, but also views held by a large majority of early Muslim scholars. Al-Qaeda's claim of adherence to the tradition of the 'Salaf' (pious predecessors of the 'ummah') thus falls apart. Consequently, this unprecedented practice of jihad defies any logic, reason, religion, and convention--except their own.
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HUMAN RIGHTS
The Civil Liberties Implications Of Counterterrorism Policies
Freedom House
In the history of the United States, the American commitment to civil liberties has frequently been put to the test. The Alien and Sedition Acts of the late eighteenth century, the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the persecution of war critics during World War I and the Red Scare that followed it, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the McCarthyite phenomenon during the early cold war, and the government's campaign of surveillance targeting opponents of the Vietnam War--all were driven by a perceived need to protect the United States against foreign adversaries or internal subversion. The darker chapters of American history, especially those involving crackdowns against immigrants and political dissent, have almost always occurred during times of war or the threat of war. It is within the context of a history in which the rights of the individual have been placed in jeopardy mainly during wartime that we must assess American counterterrorism policies in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. This report deals with those aspects of President George W. Bush's counterterrorism agenda that have drawn criticism from civil libertarians and others in the United States and abroad, including the USA PATRIOT Act, warrantless domestic surveillance, extraordinary renditions, harsh detention and interrogation policies, the opening of a special detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and efforts to curtail judicial review of such matters.
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AL-QAEDA
Seven Years Later: The Jihadist International
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Understanding al Qaeda's true character, structure, and strategy provides important clues about why the organization has not been able to ignite a global jihad. Still, the organization poses a grave threat to international stability and to the United States in particular. The next generation of al Qaeda leaders may be able to deliver more localized sporadic deadly attacks. Seven years after the worst lethal attack against the U.S. mainland, the leadership of the group that claimed responsibility continues to survive with impunity. Since 2001, al Qaeda, a loosely defined organization, has had a volatile history. It has lost, then partially recovered, its main launch pad in the Afghan plateau; precariously secured, then been substantially beaten out of, a new base of operations in Iraq; claimed credit for a series of terrorist acts across the globe -- shattering lives and confidence in security and state authority in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East; and initiated a failed insurgency in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of its principal, Osama bin Laden. But its hopes of igniting a global jihad have not materialized. Instead, its efforts have been effectively curtailed in many locales, it has suffered considerable setbacks in others, and it has had to confront ideological and dogmatic challenges.
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SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The increasing use of unconventional, “soft' measures to combat violent extremism in Saudi Arabia is bearing positive results, leading others in the region, including the United States in Iraq, to adopt a similar approach. Understanding the successes of the Saudi strategy -- composed of prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare programs -- will be important in the fight against radical Islamist extremism, says Christopher Boucek in a new Carnegie Paper. Roughly 3,000 prisoners have participated in Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation campaign -- which seeks to address the underlying factors that facilitate extremism and prevent further violent Islamism. Saudi authorities claim a rehabilitation success rate of 80 to 90 percent, having re-arrested only 35 individuals for security offenses. Key components of the Saudi strategy: (1) Prevention: Saudi Arabia has employed hundreds of government programs to educate the public about radical Islam and extremism, as well as provide alternatives to radicalization among young men. (2) Rehabilitation: The centerpiece of the rehabilitation strategy is a comprehensive counseling program designed to re-educate violent extremists and sympathizers and to encourage extremists to renounce terrorist ideologies. (3) Aftercare programs: The Ministry of Interior employs several initiatives to ensure that counseling and rehabilitation continue after release from state custody, including a halfway house program to ease release into society and programs to reintegrate returnees from Guantanamo Bay.
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UNITED NATIONS
Security and Human Rights: Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations
Amnesty International
On 4 September 2008, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), sitting in plenary, will conduct its first review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the Global Strategy”) which it adopted two years ago, on 8 September 2006. The Global Strategy is a pathbreaking document as all States recognize in it, unequivocally, that human rights are the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The September review meeting provides an excellent opportunity for the UNGA to take stock of the implementation of the strong human rights provisions in the Global Strategy and to take concrete steps for their implementation. Regrettably, as this brief survey of global practices shows, there is a huge gap between governmental human rights rhetoric in the Global Strategy and the reality of human rights observance on the ground. Much more needs to be done to mainstream human rights throughout the UN system and States must demonstrate the political will to translate stated human rights commitments into action. Amnesty International therefore calls on the General Assembly to mark the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to make implementation of the human rights provisions of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy a top priority for the coming year.
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COUNTERTERRORISM
The Path to a Counterterrorism Doctrine
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
Since 9/11, there have been no major acts of terrorism in the U.S. This is a remarkable accomplishment. The radical Islamic adversary remains committed and driven by hate and religious fanaticism and therefore remains a threat. The radical right, long quiescent, is re-animated around immigration and eminent domain. Environmental and animal rights extremists who have for years rejected taking lives are now speaking in terms of killing people to get attention. The question that keeps public safety professionals awake is this: what will be the next worst thing? We observe and study attempted attacks and develop countermeasures, such as limiting the quantity of fluids in carry-on luggage, but the adversary is watching too. One thing is certain, without reliable intelligence and the courage to follow the empirical data wherever it may take us, we will not anticipate emerging threats, we will be surprised again and people will die. Unifying intelligence capabilities must be our first task. Despite its limitations, actionable intelligence is the key to preventing attacks from any quarter. The terrorist, like water, will take the path of least resistance.
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LATIN AMERICA and CARRIBEAN
Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Latin America and Caribbean Region
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
This report provides an overview of issues relevant to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy in the Western Hemisphere, paying particular attention to the Latin America and Caribbean region (LACR). It outlines some of the security-related threats in the region, including those related to international and domestic terrorism, and discusses the region's preparedness to address these real and perceived vulnerabilities. Rather than focusing on domestic terrorism, this report concentrates on international terrorism, which has been the focus of the United Nations post-2001 counterterrorism efforts, and includes a comprehensive analysis of the Strategy-related counterterrorism efforts of a number of important stakeholders in the region, including relevant elements of the UN system, in particular a number of entities represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force; the Organization of American States (OAS); and subregional bodies and frameworks such as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the South American Financial Action Task Force, the Caribbean Community, MERCOSUR, the Central American Integration System, and the 3+1 Group on Tri- Border Area Security.
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