CONFLICT RESOLUTION: Conciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan
This report is a preliminary mapping of initiatives designed to promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. It is a snapshot in time, focusing on practices or arrangements that were still ongoing during the
second half of 2008, or had recently been undertaken and stored, as it were, in the public inventory of conflict mitigating and peacebuilding measures. The report focuses on initiatives related to the insurgency
mounted by Taliban soon after they were driven from power by the US and the Northern Alliance forces in late 2001. The insurgency steadily gained strength after 2004 and, while most strongly entrenched in the
east and the south, by the end of 2008 the insurgents had moved closer to Kabul. They posed a serious threat to the authority of the government, were a growing source of regional tension, particularly in relation to
Pakistan, and challenged the very credibility of NATO, which failed to get the military upper hand despite increasing force deployment. By the end of 2008, the international force level in Afghanistan had reached
79 000. With scheduled additions of US troops in 2009, it would rise to around 100 000, approximating the size of the Soviet contingent before Kremlin started the withdrawal in 1989. Until late 2008, the parties to
the conflict concentrated their efforts on weakening or defeating the adversary. Chr. Michelsen Institute (January 2009)
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SECURITY FORCES: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces
The situation in Afghanistan has reached the crisis point, and one where President Obama has warned for the first time that the Afghan government, the United States, and NATO/ISAF may be losing. The
Taliban, Haqqani, and HIG forces have become far more lethal, and casualties for U.S., NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are on the rise. U.S. commanders have
called for 20,000 to 35,000 more troops, but only 17,000 are likely to be deployed this year. This is the number needed to buy time, not the number of U.S., NATO/ISAF, and Afghan forces needed to win, secure
the country, and allow it to build. The United States will approach the limit of the number of forces it can deploy and sustain if it does eventually build up to the 25,000 to 30,000 more troops that General McKeirnon
has requested. NATO/ISAF forces may increase slightly but will remain a diverse mix of forces from some 41 countries divided by national caveats and restrictions on their use. Any effective counterinsurgency
strategy in Afghanistan must rely on building up strong Afghan security forces and using them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development.
Finding the right path to such force development will be one of the most critical single decisions the new Obama administration will make in trying to reverse the course of a war that is now being lost. Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies (March 2009)
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HUMAN RIGHTS: Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians
Ordinary citizens increasingly feel the impact of Afghanistan’s ongoing armed conflict. Both anti government elements (AGEs) and other parties involved in the conflict are responsible for violence that affects the
civilian population. This report documents how, in their attempts to weaken the Afghan Government, the Taliban and other AGEs are systematically terrorizing the civilian population with 'night letters,' kidnappings,
executions (often by beheading) and other crimes. In their campaign to undermine support for the Government the Taliban fail to differentiate between military objectives and civilians, targeting civilians intentionally.
Their targets include doctors, teachers, students, tribe elders, Ulema Council members, civilian government employees, suppliers and day laborers of public-interest reconstruction projects as well as former police
and military personnel. For instance, the simple act of being a civil servant or being friendly with government officials is frequently seen as enough to justify an attack. In an attempt to further weaken public support
for the government, insurgents have also targeted schools, medical services, humanitarian aid and commercial supply lines. These attacks have a severe impact far beyond their immediate victims and the effects of
these abuses on Afghan society as a whole will be described, with a focus on the specific areas of social economy, education and health care. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (December 2008)
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ELECTIONS: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building Democracy in Afghanistan
This paper assesses preparations for and attitudes toward the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan. Presidential and Provincial Council elections are due to take place in August or September of 2009, followed by
Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of Parliament) and District Council elections in mid-2010. The paper provides background information about how the first set of elections was conducted in 2004 and 2005; it notes the
lack of activity or preparations for future elections in the interim period. Following the background discussion, the paper focuses on two distinct, but overlapping, areas. (1) Technical Processes: This section
discusses a number of the technical processes that need to be implemented immediately if the coming elections are to be seen as credible and legitimate. These include voter registration (which began in October
2008), candidate vetting, the formation and enforcement of candidate financing rules, and raising public awareness. Key issues and potential challenges for each of these processes are discussed in depth. (2)
Contextual Issues: While technical processes are extremely important, they are not executed in a vacuum and must take account of the context. Implementing elections in any post-conflict context poses a
significant challenge, but doing so in Afghanistan raises particular issues. Two major challenges considered here are the urgent need to build capacity on a large scale and the deteriorating security situation in the
country. These elections can only be considered 'successful' if they are perceived as such by the Afghan population. Only then will this electoral cycle contribute significantly to the strengthening of democracy in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (November 2008)
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ARMED CONFLICT: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency
operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The
U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along
with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better
the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive. RAND Corporation (June 2008)
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: Humanitarianism Under Threat
Humanitarianism is under deep threat in Afghanistan. Humanitarian actors and the principles they profess are under attack. The ability of humanitarian agencies to address urgent need is compromised by internal
and external factors, i.e., both by the organization and modus operandi of aid agencies on the ground, and by an extremely volatile and dangerous operating environment. The UN is, and is seen as, aligned with the
US-led coalition intervention. Its humanitarian capacity is weak and further diminished by its incorporation, until very recently, into an essentially political, integrated mission. The separate OCHA (Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) office that had existed since 1988 was disbanded when the integrated mission was launched in 2002. A humanitarian unit was only re-established within the United Nations
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2007. This arrangement was seen as unsatisfactory, especially by international NGOs who, as the crisis deepened, advocated repeatedly for the creation of a separate OCHA
office, a move that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and the UN headquarters political departments opposed, but that OCHA headquarters and the Emergency Relief Coordinator
(ERC) supported. While it has recently been decided (December 2008) to separate the humanitarian coordination function out of the mission through the establishment of a separate OCHA office, the problem of
perception of alignment and inadequate UN humanitarian capacity remains. Feinstein International Center // Tufts University (March 2009)
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CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
The armed conflict intensified significantly throughout Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, with a corresponding rise in civilian casualties and a significant erosion of humanitarian space. In addition to fatalities as a direct
result of armed hostilities, civilians have suffered from injury, loss of livelihood, displacement, destruction of property, as well as disruption of access to education, healthcare and other essential services. UNAMA
Human Rights recorded a total of 2118 civilian casualties between 01 January and 31 December 2008. This figure represents an increase of almost 40% on the 1523 civilian deaths recorded in the year of 2007.
The 2008 civilian death toll is thus the highest of any year since the end of major hostilities which resulted in the demise of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001. Of the 2118 casualties reported in 2008, 1160 (55%)
were attributed to antigovernment elements (AGEs) and 828 (39%) to pro-government forces. The remaining 130 (6%) could not be attributed to any of the conflicting parties since, for example, some civilians died
as a result of cross-fire or were killed by unexploded ordinance. The majority of civilian casualties, namely 41%, occurred in the south of Afghanistan, which saw heavy fighting in several provinces. High casualty
figures have also been reported in the south-east (20%), east (13%), central (13%) and western (9%) regions. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (February 2009)
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PRIVATE SECURITY: Private Security Companies and Local Populations
Over the last two decades, the rapid growth of private security companies (PSCs) has been discussed and analysed from various angles. Scholars, the media, as well as governmental and nongovernmental
organizations embarked on a discourse about the advantages and disadvantages of the private security industry. Studies on PSCs tackled issues such as PSCs’ legal status, questions of accountability, or options for
regulations.2 Yet, so far little attention has been paid to how PSCs affect local populations in the countries in which they operate. PSCs are hired by a diverse clientele such as governments, private companies,
humanitarian organizations or individuals. In addition to providing security to their clientele, the activities and presence of PSCs may have unintended consequences not only for those that employ them but also for
local populations. A better understanding of how private security firms influence the lives of third parties and how local populations view PSCs seems relevant for an informed discussion on the regulation of the
commercial security industry. This exploratory study aims to contribute some new insights and perspectives into this field by discussing these aspects for two country cases, Afghanistan and Angola. swisspeace (April 2008)
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DRUGS: Afghanistan Opium Survey
The 2009 Opium Winter Rapid Assessment is based on a small sample of villages and the results are meant to be indicative. Following the 19 % reduction in opium cultivation in 2008 (157,000 ha), the 2009 Opium
Winter Rapid Assessment (ORA) anticipates a further decrease in opium cultivation. There are no provinces which are likely to show an increase in opium cultivation. The eighteen provinces reported to be
poppy-free in 2008, are likely to remain poppyfree in 2009. ORA results indicate that fourteen are confirmed as likely to remain poppyfree while the other four provinces, Nangarhar Ghor, Samangan, and Sari Pul,
could not yet be ascertained. Nangarhar is likely to be almost poppy free but more data is needed for confirmation. The results for Ghor, Samangan and Sari Pul provinces could not be assessed since cultivation in
these provinces takes place during the spring season (March/April). A strong decrease in opium cultivation is expected in Baghlan and Hirat provinces and opium elimination activities can make these provinces
poppy-free. Overall, the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan is likely to decrease in 2009 and the number of poppy-free provinces may increase to twenty-two if timely and appropriate poppy eradication measures
are implemented in Baghlan, Hirat, Badakhshan and Faryab provinces. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (November 2008)
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ARMED CONFLICT: Struggle For Kabul: The Taliban Advance
While the international community's prospects in Afghanistan have never been bleaker, the Taliban has been experiencing a renaissance that has gained momentum since 2005. At the end of 2001, uprooted from
its strongholds and with its critical mass shattered, it was viewed as a spent force. It was naively assumed by the US and its allies that the factors which propelled the Taliban to prominence in Afghanistan would
become moribund in parallel to its expulsion from the country. The logic ran that as ordinary Afghans became aware of the superiority of a western democratic model, and the benefits of that system flowed down
to every corner of the country, then the Taliban’s rule would be consigned to the margins of Afghan history. However, as seven years of missed opportunity have rolled by, the Taliban has rooted itself across
increasing swathes of Afghan territory. According to research undertaken by ICOS throughout 2008, the Taliban now has a permanent presence in 72% of the country. Moreover, it is now seen as the de facto
governing power in a number of southern towns and villages. This figure is up from 54% in November 2007, as outlined in the ICOS report Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink. The increase in their
geographic spread illustrates that the Taliban's political, military and economic strategies are now more successful than the West’s in Afghanistan. Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south, the Taliban are
at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will The International Council on Security and Development (December 2008)
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REFUGEES: Displacement, Human Development, and Security
Nearly five million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002 and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) often cites Afghanistan as a positive example of refugee
repatriation. In reality, however, the return of Afghan refugees may prove to be one of the most ill-conceived policies in the Islamic world in recent times. Far from ‘going home’ to rebuild and make peace, many
returning refugees are struggling to survive or have returned to Pakistan and Iran in the search of security and labour. A majority (80 percent) of the Kabul population (including many returning refugees and IDPs)
live in squatter settlements that cover about 69 percent of the total residential area of the city. Many returning refugees are unemployed, and are going hungry. In effect they are adding to the growing number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan, displaced for a range of reasons from conflict to environmental degradation. As this paper suggests, the net effect of these displacement trends is to severely
undermine the potential for human development (or human security) for the displaced as well as those who depend on them, and to stall rather than promote economic development in Afghanistan. There are also
potentially wider national and regional security implications, including the growth of cross-border smuggling and trafficking, growing support for the insurgency in Afghanistan, and increasingly tense relations
between Afghanistan and its neighbours Iran and Pakistan. Geneva Centre for Security Policy // Griffith University, Australia // US-Islamic World Forum 2009 (February 2009)
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HEALTH: In Service of Afghanistan's Most Vulnerable Population
With the second highest maternal mortality ratio in the world, 'every 28 minutes a woman dies in Afghanistan during childbirth'. In the short term, maternal mortality will not be significantly lowered unless
international assistance can meet the immediate needs of women at risk of dying as a result of child birth. Unfortunately, poor communication and a lack of understanding between civilians and the military are
decreasing the efficiency of international assistance programs, the security of civilian aid workers and vulnerable populations. During a combat operation on February 20th 2007, US Forces acquired the office of an
International Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) as a military necessity. The NGO, implementing behavior change education critical to women accessing medical care during child birth, chose to suspend
operations and vacate the compound in an attempt to preserve their status as impartial and independent from military forces. This incident is just one example of a tactical military decision not supporting the
strategic goal to win the peace in Afghanistan, but is a symptom of a more fundamental problem. Civilian players need to find the balance between separation from and integration with the military and share
information with the military in protection of their independence; and the military must embrace the protection of civilian space as essential to winning the peace. Maternal and Child Health Departments // Boston University School of Public Health (March 2008)
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