TERRORISM: Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks
Suicide missions�or attacks whose success is dependent on the death of their perpetrator/s�are one of the most lethal tactics employed by terrorist and insurgent groups today. Moreover, they have demonstrated great potential to create turbulence in international affairs. The four suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq�where suicide operations have become the signature mode of attack�have highlighted how this tactic can lead to considerable losses of human life and physical infrastructure while influencing the course of global events in their wake. During the 1980s and 1990s, suicide missions wreaked considerable havoc on their targets; yet these targets were relatively few in number. The vast majority of attacks took place in only a handful of countries, namely, Israel, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. More than thirty-five countries on every continent save for Antarctica and Australia have experienced the wanton violence brought on by suicide attacks. In the past decade, suicide bombings have not only occurred in a growing number of countries, but these attacks have been planned and executed by an even greater number of organizations and have killed larger numbers of people every year. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press // Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs // Harvard University (December 2008)

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SAUDI ARABIA: Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists
Saudi Arabia has been the target of sporadic terrorist activity since the 1960s, when Gamal Abdul Nasser made repeated attempts to create groups that could overthrow the Saudi government, and to subvert the Saudi military. Saudi Arabia had a major clash with radical Islamists on November 20, 1979, when Sunni militants seized control of the Grand Mosque in Makkah, one of the holiest sites in Islam. The Saudi military, along with the special counter-terrorism forces of an allied country, regained control of the mosque several weeks later. More than 200 troops and militants were killed, and 60 militants were subsequently executed. Saudi Arabia also experienced Shi'ite riots in the Eastern Province, and some sporadic incidents and petty sabotage. Saudi Arabia only began to experience serious internal security problems, however, when Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda actively turned against the monarchy in the mid-1990s.and began to launch terrorist attacks in an effort to destroy it. The Kingdom was the first target of al-Qaeda when, in November 1995 the U.S.-operated National Guard Training Center in Riyadh was attacked, killing five Americans. This subsequently led to the arrest and execution of four men, purportedly inspired by Osama bin Laden. Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 2005)

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CENTRAL ASIA: Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The "Al-Qaedaization" of Uzbek Jihadism
In Central Asia, the real impact of Islamist groups is a controversial subject. Some organizations are known for their actions. Others owe their celebrity to actions attributed to them, sometimes without solid evidence. One can find a striking example of such a situation with the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, the Party of Liberation) in Central Asia. It is not unusual to read both analysts and government officials proclaiming that the non-violent but radical HT is the main 'Islamist terrorist' problem in Central Asia. Some do not hesitate to compare HT to Al-Qaeda, even saying that it could soon replace the terrorist group, or become more dangerous than it in the long term.' The problem with such fears is that anything can happen in the long term, therefore such arguments are not really convincing. Besides, other than distributing ideological leaflets, the HT in Central Asia has never appeared as a real security issue, aside from overfilling Central Asian mailboxes.2 However, the comparison is still interesting. As Al-Qaeda is now the yardstick of any global terrorist threat, it is important to know if there is indeed an Al-Qaedan threat in Central Asia�a region which is on the frontline of the war for Afghanistan, and is beginning to attract the interest of Europeans and others due to its oil and gas deposits. Institut Francais de Relations Internationales (December 2008)

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TERRORISM: Current Trends in al-Qaeda and Global Jihad Activity
In recent years, a serious academic discussion about the al-Qaeda (or AQC - al Qaeda Central) organization has been underway, once that has also found its way into the popular media. It has focused on whether AQC has ceased functioning as an active organization and turned into an icon only, and whether its role as leader of the global jihad has been assumed by a mass movement run by a network of people, groups, and organizations whose members have undergone a process of self-radicalization. A response to this question may be found in an analysis of the activities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but also depends on understanding the concept of struggle according to al-Qaeda and its relationship with its affiliates. Al-Qaeda views itself as the leader of the global jihad movement and as a role model for its affiliates. As such, the organization has sought to stage dramatic and innovative terrorist attacks that pave the way for its collaborators, without insisting on exclusivity for acts undertaken in the name of the global jihad. Moreover, al-Qaeda has encouraged independent activity, which is often carried out without its approval or knowledge. Institute for National Security Studies (July 2008)

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SOUTHEAST ASIA: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages
At the advent of the War on Terror in the fall of 2001, there was a great deal of skepticism by politicians and pundits alike that Al Qaeda had penetrated the region. The conventional wisdom was that although every country in Southeast Asia has a Muslim community, indeed Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, Islam was built upon indigenous culture and was thus more moderate. The vast majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia are secular and tolerant and they eschew the violence and radicalism associated with Islam in the Middle East and South Asia. It was not until the 12 October 2002 terrorist attack on Bali, 13 months after 11 September attacks on the United States, that opinions began to change and the Indonesian government acknowledged that Al Qaeda was active within the archipelago. This paper seeks to explain the linkages of Al Qaeda to the region, but also explore what is the nature of those linkages. At one end of the spectrum, there are clearly groups and individuals who are influenced by and share a similar world view as Osama bin Laden. Indeed, Al Qaeda in many ways has been transformed from an organization to an ideology. At the other end of the spectrum Al Qaeda has established its own network and grafted onto pre-existing Islamic movements and found common cause with them, such as with the MILF. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research // S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies // Nanyang Technological University (March 2003)

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TERRORISM: The Evolution of Franchise Terrorism: Al-Qaeda
On 21 December 2000, in a flat in northern Frankfurt, German intelligence discovered a bag of weapons presumed to belong to Islamic extremists. During the subsequent raid, weapons, bomb-making chemicals, false identity cards, mobile phones, copies of credit cards, an address book and a video-tape were found, indicating the existence of an active terrorist cell that aimed to attack the Strasbourg Christmas market. Subsequent investigations by German, French and British intelligence services pointed to the existence of a mujahideen network of Algerian extremists who had been active in France since the early 1990s and whose activities now expanded not only across Western European capitals, but also Canada and the USA where they planned to bomb Los Angeles airport. In fact, following the discovery of the link to a Tunisian terrorist cell in Milan, it became clear that a network of young Muslim extremists who had been recruited in Europe and trained in Afghan camps were planning attacks anywhere in the world. The prime suspect behind this network was Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda movement, already suspects for training the Somali militia that shot down two Black Hawk helicopters in 1993 in Mogadishu, killing 18 American servicemen, as well as the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that had killed 225 persons. It was only a matter of time before one of these cells was successful in launching a devastating blow. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (September 2008)

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ALGERIA: Salafism and Radical Politics in Post-Conflict Algeria
Since the civil war of the 1990s, Algeria's government has given moderate Islamist parties only a superficial role in politics. Consequently, support for Algerian Salafism, which rejects the country's political system, has increased, creating for its followers a separate Islamic way of life without engagement in politics or confrontation with the army. In a new paper, Amel Boubekeur examines how the rise of Salafism indicates the need for Algeria to increase political transparency and participation and engage its citizens, particularly the young, to discourage radicalization outside the political system. Violence continues to plague the country despite security measures, enacted at the expense of civil liberties. By cancelling elections and outlawing the radical Islamist party Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992, the Algerian government effectively pushed radicals out of the political system. In turn, many turned to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to advance their agenda, while others joined movements rejecting participatory politics and preserving radicalism, such as Da'wa Salafism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2008)

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NATURAL RESOURCES: For a Few Dollar$ More: How Al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade
This report seeks to examine whether the terrorist group, al Qaeda, is used, and is continuing to use, rough diamonds. Global Witness presents evidence that confirms that al Qaeda has been involved in the rough diamond trade since the 1990s. Firstly in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. It argues that there are several reasons why al Qaeda has used rough diamonds: As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells; To hide money targeted by financial sanctions; To launder the profits of criminal activity; To convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily transportable. The report also briefly discusses the use of other high-value commodities, such as gold and tanzanite, by al Qaeda, and the precedent set by Hizbullah of using diamonds to fund their operations. In doing so, it reveals that the trade networks and routes used by al Qaeda to gain access to rough diamonds are the same as those used for trading conflict and illicit diamonds. It also notes that such diamond trading routes overlap with illicit arms trading, and informal support and trading networks between terrorists, rebel groups as well as regional insecurity and outright conflict. Global Witness (April 2003)

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NORTH AFRICA: Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The "Newest" Front in the War on Terror
The recent formation of al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) could be interpreted as the opening of a new battlefield in the cause of international jihad. Such a front, however, is not unprecedented. Algerian veterans of the 1980s Afghan campaign against the Soviets returned home and played a key role in the Islamist insurgency. Composed mainly of Algerian 'Afghans,' the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) committed unspeakable atrocities in the 1990s. Moroccan and Algerian emigre communities in Europe, moreover, have played important roles in financing for al Qaeda and a variety of North African Salafist groups. Given its consolidation of North African Salafist terrorist groups under one umbrella, al Qaeda in the Maghreb does present substantial security challenges for North African and European governments. Terrorism in the Mediterranean region has grown recently because of numerous factors. By far the most important have been the growing fundamentalism of some Maghrebi communities in Europe, the failures of the jihadist movement (most notably in Algeria), and the financial largesse provided to jihadist terror organizations by Islamist civil society and criminal networks. Duke University // Mediterranean Quarterly (November 2008)

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YEMEN: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb
Away from media headlines, a war has been raging on and off in Yemen's northern governorate of Saada since 2004, flaring up in adjacent regions and, in 2008, reaching the outskirts of the capital, Sanaa. The conflict, which has brought about extensive destruction, pits a rebel group, known generically as the Huthis, against government forces. Today's truce is fragile and risks being short-lived. A breakdown would threaten Yemen's stability, already under severe duress due to the global economic meltdown, depleting national resources, renewed tensions between the country's northern elites and populations in the south and the threat from violent groups with varied links to al-Qaeda. Nor would the impact necessarily be contained within national borders. The country should use its traditional instruments � social and religious tolerance, cooptation of adversaries � to forge a more inclusive compact that reduces sectarian stigmatisation and absorbs the Huthis. International actors � principally Gulf states and the West � should use their leverage and the promise of reconstruction assistance to press both government and rebels to compromise. International Crisis Group ()

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TERRORISM: Does al-Qaida Articulate a Consistent Strategy? A Study of al-Qaida Leadership Statements, 2001-2009
In the popular and scholarly debate on al-Qaida's ideology, it has been commonplace to focus on the religious nature of its 'salafi-jihadi' doctrines and dismiss the notion of an underlying strategy of a political nature. The debate has been somewhat dominated by two positions: one minority school that identifies a rational strategy behind al-Qaida's violence and the majority view which stresses its religious, millenarian, and irrational character. In this article, I find that although many core elements of al-Qaida's message has stayed the same, there are a number of conflicting themes in the leadership's discourse on strategy. First, the exact nature of al-Qaida's triple-headed enemy, the Zionist-Crusader-Apostate alliance, is not clearly defined. The description of the enemy varies considerably from one statement to another. The list of enemies has expanded dramatically, and their prioritization has become blurred. There has been a noticeable shift towards 'the near enemy', that is the apostate rulers in the Muslim world. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment // Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (February 2009)

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EAST AFRICA: Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn
Al-Qaeda has had greater success in East Africa and the Horn than any other part of sub-Sahara Africa. Relative proximity to the Middle East and a series of local factors account for this situation. Al-Qaeda carried out the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and bombed an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya north of Mombasa in 2002. Local and international authorities foiled a number of other al-Qaeda plots in the region. Osama bin Laden had his headquarters in Sudan from late 1991 until Sudan forced him to leave in mid-1996. Subsequent al-Qaeda efforts, which were already well advanced in Kenya and Somalia, tended to emanate from those two countries. But while acknowledging there is a real al-Qaeda problem in the region, there is a tendency by the US, a few countries in the region, and al-Qaeda itself to exaggerate its impact and influence. This only plays into the hands of al-Qaeda and focuses scarce US resources primarily on the short-term goal of tracking down al-Qaeda while reducing attention and resources for dealing with the long-term reasons why al-Qaeda has been able to function in the region. Eliminating al-Qaeda is important but it will not be accomplished solely by military action against suspected al-Qaeda operatives. It is time to confront this as a long-term challenge that addresses more effectively its root causes. University of New Brunswick (July 2007)

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