

ENDNOTES

1. The conflicts in question in these figures include previously uncounted wars being waged between non-state groups where a government is not one of the warring parties. These are not counted in other conflict datasets.
2. See UCDP/Human Security Centre dataset.
3. Barbara Harff, "Assessing the Risks of Genocide and Politicide," in *Peace and Conflict, 2005*, Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, ed. (University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005) 57-61. See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2006).
4. The number of refugees (displaced persons who have crossed an international boundary) declined 12.5%—from 9.6 million in 2003 to 8.4 million in 2005. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) declined by 3.7% from 24.6 million to 23.7 million. See the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website (<http://www.unhcr.ch/>, accessed 15 December 2006) and the website of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (<http://www.internal-displacement.org>, accessed 15 December 2006).
5. Data provided by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, 2005.
6. Note that Sudan is counted as part of the Middle East and north Africa region and therefore does not figure in the sub-Saharan African total.
7. Deaths from the genocide in Rwanda, which did not involve fighting but rather the slaughter of unarmed civilians, are not counted in most conflict battle-death datasets. They are, however, counted in UCDP's recently created "one-sided violence" dataset that is reviewed in Chapter 2. While there have been a number of reports suggesting that the war death toll in Darfur is well in excess of 100,000, most of these deaths are attributable to war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition, and are not directly caused by violence.
8. First, governments and non-state armed groups rarely claim responsibility for killing civilians, and UCDP's coding rules preclude it from recording deaths committed by unknown perpetrators. In Iraq thousands of civilian deaths have likely gone unrecorded by UCDP for this reason. Second, when members of non-state armed groups do not wear uniforms it is often impossible to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Insurgent deaths may be counted as civilian deaths as a consequence.
9. Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, 78, no.4 (July/August 1999): 36-44.
10. UCDP, Uppsala University; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2-3 (June 2005): 145-166.
11. A list of all 31 conflicts, including the names of the warring parties, is available on the *Human Security Brief 2006* website at <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info>. New conflicts involve two parties that have not previously fought each other and which result in at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year. Restarted conflicts are those where, after a period of at least one year of inactivity (i.e., fewer than 25 battle deaths), renewed fighting between two parties that have previously fought each other again results in at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year. Ongoing conflicts are those where fighting between two parties, which were in conflict in the preceding year, results in at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year.
12. Ten state-based armed conflicts that were active in 2004 were not active in 2005: Georgia vs. the breakaway republic South Ossetia; Uzbekistan vs. the Jihad Islamic Group; India vs. the National Democratic Front of Bodoland; India vs. separatists in Tripura; Haiti vs. rebels; Ivory Coast vs. Forces Nouvelles; Angola vs. Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda; Nigeria vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in northern Nigeria; Nigeria vs. Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force; and Sudan vs. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.
13. The five wars recorded by UCDP in 2005 were as follows: Colombia: government vs. FARC-EP and ELN; Afghanistan: government and allied countries vs. Taliban; India (Kashmir): government vs. Kashmir insurgents; Nepal: government vs. Maoists; Iraq: government and allied countries vs. insurgents.

14. Note that fatality estimates are always subject to error. The UCDP/Human Security Centre dataset records “best,” “low,” and “high” estimates for each category of political violence each year. The “best estimate” is the figure that UCDP regards as being most credible, based on the most authoritative available information. Although only “best estimates” are published in the *Brief*, “low” and “high” estimates are available on the *Human Security Brief* website at <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info>.
15. UCDP, Uppsala University; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
16. UCDP, Uppsala University; Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia.
17. The figures for the Middle East and north Africa considerably underestimate the death toll in this region. As noted elsewhere, UCDP’s stringent coding rules, together with the nature of the Iraq conflict with its unusually large number of active militia and insurgent groups, who rarely wear uniforms and who almost never take responsibility for the deaths that they cause, makes coding many of the violent deaths in that country simply impossible. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding efforts to assess the death toll in Iraq see *Human Security Research*, “In Focus: Conflict Related-Mortality,” November 2006, <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org>. The Middle East and north Africa region also includes Sudan and thus the conflict in Darfur. Most of the violent deaths in Darfur are the result of intentional attacks on unarmed civilians, not armed combat. UCDP codes these deaths as deaths from one-sided violence as opposed to battle deaths. One-sided violence is discussed at length elsewhere in this *Brief*.
18. The conflict in Iraq poses particular problems in terms of the coding and counting of battle deaths. It should also be noted that battle-death counts do not include the very large number of people who die from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. In poor countries these deaths can greatly exceed battle deaths. Currently “indirect death” tolls are only measured in a handful of countries.
19. See the UCDP codebook at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm (accessed 14 December 2006).
20. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths 2005,” *European Journal of Population*, 21, no. 2-3 (June 2005): 145-166.
21. Examples of little-known non-state conflicts in 2005 include Izzi tribe vs. Ukele tribe (Nigeria) Garre subclan of Irir-Hawiye clan vs. Murule clan (Somalia); LTTE vs. LTTE-Karuna faction (Sri Lanka); and Mara Salvatrucha vs. Mara 18 (Guatemala).
22. Estimates of the numbers killed since the US-led invasion in 2003 vary wildly and are the subject of increasingly bitter contestation. UCDP and the much-cited NGO Iraq Body Count have war-death estimates in the tens of thousands, but a 2006 population survey, whose findings were published in the UK journal, *The Lancet*, in October 2006, claimed that over 600,000 people had been killed. The accuracy of the *Lancet* estimate remains the subject of intense—and unresolved—controversy among Iraq experts, epidemiologists, and statisticians. But although the different counting methodologies create radically different death counts, the trends revealed in all the estimates are identical—each reveals a steady and significant increase in the rate of killing. Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, “Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: a Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey,” *The Lancet* (11 October 2006), <http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2006).
23. See the UCDP codebook at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm (accessed 14 December 2006).
24. The overwhelming majority of campaigns against civilians in this period (1989 to 2005) took place in the context of intra-state conflicts.
25. See Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler, “Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 4 (2002): 461-485; and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
26. Sudan is included in UCDP’s Middle East and north Africa region.
27. Harff, “Genocide and Politicide.”
28. Harff, “Genocide and Politicide.”

29. MIPT, Terrorism Knowledge Base, <http://www.tkb.org/ChartModule.jsp> (accessed 14 December 2006). All subsequent references to MIPT terrorism data are drawn from the Terrorism Knowledge Base.
30. Ibid.
31. UCDP, Uppsala University; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2-3 (June 2005): 145-166.
32. The case of Iraq also clearly shows how different definitions and coding rules can lead to very different fatality estimates. For the years 2002 to 2005, UCDP's researchers recorded just 768 one-sided violence deaths in Iraq that had been perpetrated by non-state armed groups. Without being able to identify the perpetrators, UCDP cannot code the deaths. There were 11,409 reported deaths in this period that went uncoded because the perpetrators were unknown. There is no doubt that a sizeable number of these latter fatalities were civilians. MIPT does not have the same stringent coding rules as UCDP, so we would expect that its dataset would record more intentionally perpetrated civilian deaths. This is in fact the case. For the years 2002 to 2005, MIPT recorded 9,259 civilian deaths from domestic and international terror attacks in Iraq.
33. See <http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp> for MIPT's definition of terrorism.
34. UCDP records a "high estimate" of nearly 56,000 deaths for Darfur in this period—a figure that could not be confirmed.
35. Knowingly forcing people into situations where they would die from disease and malnutrition is quite consistent with Professor Harff's definition of genocide/politicide.
36. See Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (New York: Security Council, United Nations, November 28, 2005), http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page_779 (accessed 14 December 2006).
37. UCDP calls these high-intensity conflicts "wars."
38. Given the sharp reduction in the overall number of conflicts being fought in the new millennium compared with the 1990s, it is not surprising that there should be a commensurate decline in the numbers of conflicts starting and ending each year as well. As a percentage of all conflicts, the number of conflicts starting and ending each year did not change very much from the 1990s to the 2000 to 2005 period.
39. It is possible that conflict prevention policies may be effective even when conflict numbers rise—i.e., it is possible that there would have been even more conflicts had there been no prevention policies. It is also possible, though unlikely, that conflicts that ended in negotiated settlements would have ended absent external help. Barbara Walter's *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), offers a compelling analysis of why external mediation is so often a necessary condition for peace agreements to be successfully negotiated.
40. Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 87.
41. Low-intensity conflicts are those with 25 or more, but less than 1,000, battle deaths a year.
42. Conflict episodes are not necessarily the same as conflicts. If a single conflict episode comes to an end and does not restart, it constitutes a conflict. But if a conflict episode stops then starts again, with the same actors and over the same basic issue, the entire period becomes a single conflict with two separate conflict episodes.
43. For detailed descriptions of UCDP's definitions, see UCDP, *Armed Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook*, http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf (accessed 14 December 2006).
44. Some 20 of the 372 terminations could not be coded in any of the major categories.

45. See Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). The ending of quite a number of conflicts in this period had little or nothing to do with diplomatic interventions; some ended in victory, and a larger number petered out without any assistance from the outside at all.
46. Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (June 2004): 269-292; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, ed., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
47. This section draws heavily on Lotta Harbom, Stina Högladh, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (September 2006): 617-631.
48. Ibid.
49. UCDP's category of "negotiated settlements" includes both peace agreements and ceasefires. In the 1990s, perhaps surprisingly, peace agreements—which are often preceded by ceasefires and which include de facto ceasefire provisions—had a slightly higher failure rate (45%) than ceasefires that were signed without a formal peace agreement (41%).
50. Evaluating the impact of negotiated settlements is a highly complicated process. UCDP's coding rules can both overestimate and underestimate the positive impact of peace settlements. In the fall of 2005 the Human Security Centre commissioned a review of the UCDP conflict terminations dataset from Stanford University's Bethany Lacina. The review noted that UCDP's definition of a negotiated settlement did not count settlements unless they were signed in the year that the fighting stopped, or the calendar year that followed. So settlements that took two or more years to negotiate after the fighting stopped did not appear in the dataset. Recoding the data from 1989 to 2005 to include the missing settlements, Lacina found that the probability of negotiated settlements failing was actually 56%, not the 47% indicated by UCDP's coding rules. But she also pointed out that UCDP's strict definition of agreements meant that settlements that dramatically reduce overall levels of violence between the parties, but still incur 25 fatalities in any postsettlement year, will be counted as failures. For detailed descriptions of UCDP's definitions, see UCDP, *Armed Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook*, http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf.
51. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 36-44.
52. To be more precise, conflicts that end in victories have a 15.5% chance of reoccurring within five years; those that end in negotiations have a 28.7% of reoccurring within five years. Stanford University's Bethany Lacina (background note commissioned by the Human Security Centre), using data from 1989 to 2005, has argued that negotiated settlements that fail in the first year should also be included in UCDP's conflict terminations dataset—UCDP excludes them. Using this more expansive definition of a peace agreement, over a five-year period fully 56% of negotiated settlements fail, compared with just 15.5% of wars that end in victory.
53. Chester Crocker, "A Poor Case for Quitting," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 183-186.
54. Edward Luttwak, "Stay Home," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 36-44.
55. Some wars may simply peter out with neither a victory nor a peace agreement.
56. For an explanation of the term "mutually hurting stalemate," see William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
57. Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 85.
58. Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (October 2006): 736-756.

59. Fen Osler Hampson, Chester A. Crocker, and Pamela Aall, "If the World's Getting More Peaceful, Why Are We Still in Danger?" *Globe and Mail*, 20 October 2005, A25. The authors were responding to the findings of the 2005 *Human Security Report*. The claim that today's wars are more intractable than those of earlier years is supported by the findings of a 2004 study of the duration of 122 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 by James Fearon. Fearon found that the average length of ongoing wars had increased from some two years in 1946 to 15 years in 1999—suggesting that they were indeed becoming more intractable. See James Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275-301. Note that Professor Fearon's dataset only covers civil wars, not the minor armed conflicts that UCDP includes, and that it only extends to 1999, not 2005.
60. "Excess" here refers to death rates that exceed the "normal" death rate prior to the outbreak of conflict. See International Rescue Committee, "The Lancet Publishes IRC Mortality Study from DR Congo; 3.9 Million Have Died: 38,000 Die per Month," 6 January 2006, <http://www.theirc.org/news/page.jsp?itemID=27819067> (accessed 28 November 2006).
61. This is based on data from the Independent Evaluation Group, *Engaging With Fragile States: World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress* (Washington, DC: IBRD/WB, 2006).