

ENDNOTES

OVERVIEW

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are in the chapters that follow.
2. Office of Counterterrorism, US State Department, "Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)," 11 October 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm> (accessed 1 March 2008). Emphasis added.
3. In this chapter, the term "Islamist" refers only to those Muslim organizations that intentionally perpetrate violence against civilians. It does not refer to the many non-violent Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
4. "Africa's Wars," *The Economist*, 14 January 1999, http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TRNDVP (accessed 14 February 2008).

CHAPTER 1

5. This quote comes from a 16 October 2003 memo from Donald Rumsfeld to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Peter Pace, and Doug Feith on the "Global War on Terrorism." See Fox News Report, "Raw Data: Rumsfeld Memo to Inner Circle," 22 October 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100917,00.html> (accessed 19 February 2008).
6. As this *Brief* was going to press, the compilers of one of these datasets, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), announced that it was discontinuing its data collection activities and that elements of its "Terrorism Knowledge Base" were to be transferred to the research team at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
7. Center for American Progress, "The Terrorism Index," 20 August 2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/terrorism_index.html (accessed 19 February 2008). While the term "Islamist terrorism" can in principle refer to both Sunni and Shia attacks, in practice it is used primarily to describe the Sunni terrorism associated with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization and the various terror groups loosely affiliated with it.
8. National Intelligence Estimate, "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," April 2006, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf (accessed 19 February 2008). The terms "jihadi" or "jihadist" are used interchangeably with the term "Islamist."
9. National Intelligence Estimate, "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland," July 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf (accessed 19 February 2008). See also Michael Leiter, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center, "Looming Challenges in the War on Terror," Washington Institute, 13 February 2008, http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/wash-inst-written-sfr-final.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008).
10. "Jihadi Threat to West Undimmed," *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor* (16 January 2008), http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtasm/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jtasm/history/jtasm2008/jtasm5101.htm@current&Prod_Name=JTSM&QueryText= (accessed 14 February 2008). Whether the "increase in attack planning" was because there were actually more attacks being planned or because intelligence was simply getting better at detecting them is not clear.
11. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System," <http://wits.nctc.gov/> (accessed 4 January 2008).
12. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Incident Analysis Wizard," <http://www.tkb.org/> (accessed 17 December 2007); and START Global Terrorism Database 2 (GTD2), <http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/> (accessed 18 January 2008).
13. The best known proponent of this view is Norman Podhoretz. See his *World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism* (New York: Doubleday, 2007). Former CIA director, James Woolsey, has also argued that the struggle against Islamist terrorism should be seen as World War IV. See Charles Feldman and Stan Wilson, "Ex-CIA Director: US Faces 'World War IV,'" CNN.com, 3 April 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/03/sprj.irq.woolsey.world.war/> (accessed 19 February 2008).

14. For an overview of the perceived WMD threat see John Parachini, "Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective," *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003), http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_parachini.pdf (accessed 19 February 2008).
15. See John Mueller, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html> (accessed 19 February 2008).
16. NCTC, *Report on Terrorist Incidents—2006* (Virginia: National Counterterrorism Center, April 2007), 14-15, <http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2006nctcannexfinal.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2008).
17. MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 13 February 2008).
18. See <http://www.icasualties.org> (accessed 14 February 2008). MIPT's terrorism toll in Iraq is 57 percent of the icasualties.org figure.
19. NCTC, "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System," (accessed 4 January 2008).
20. MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 17 February 2008).
21. MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 17 February 2008); NCTC, "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System," (accessed 4 January 2008); and START, GTD2, (accessed 18 January 2008).
22. John Mueller, "Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences, and the Persistence of Fear" (paper presented at the National Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 26 February–4 March 2007), 2, <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ISA2007T.PDF> (accessed 14 February 2008).
23. Raphael F. Perl, *International Terrorism: Threat, Policy and Response* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2007), 6, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33600.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2007).
24. Reflecting the fact that "terrorism" was not usually a term used to describe intentional violence against civilians in wartime, terrorism datasets until quite recently dealt only with international terrorism. Here the issue of how to describe the intentional killing of civilians in civil wars did not arise. The same was true of attempts to measure terrorism in conflict-free Western Europe (not including the Balkans). See US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004) and Ed Mikolus, *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2004 (ITERATE 3-4)* (Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software, 2006), <http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/ssdc/ite00001.html> (accessed 19 February 2008). The TWEED dataset deals exclusively with domestic terrorism in Western Europe and so does not have to address the challenges of how to code civilian fatalities from intentional violence in civil wars. See Jan Oskar Engene, "Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 1 (2007): 109-121. See also "Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED)," <http://www.uib.no/people/sspje/tweed.htm> (accessed 19 February 2008).
25. UCDP is the Human Security Report Project's primary data supplier.
26. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Glossary," <http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp> (accessed 19 February 2008).
27. We use icasualties.org's (accessed 14 February 2008) estimate of total fatalities (military plus civilian) for Iraq in 2006. The estimate for all combat-related deaths for sub-Saharan Africa in 1999 comes from the Bethany Lacina/Nils Petter Gleditsch dataset. The Lacina/Gleditsch dataset draws on the UCDP data for the years under review. We refer to these data as UCDP data for reasons of convenience and in order to avoid confusion. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle-Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2-3 (June 2005): 145-166. START only has data to the end of 2004 and therefore cannot be used for comparisons in 2006.
28. In sub-Saharan Africa, with some exceptions, MIPT codes the fewest deaths, START codes rather more, and UCDP the most. We only have complete annual data for NCTC for 2005 and 2006. In most cases, NCTC codes greater numbers of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa than either MIPT or START.

29. Office of Counterterrorism, US State Department, "Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)," 11 October 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm> (accessed 1 March 2008). Emphasis added.
30. NCTC, "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System," (accessed 17 February 2008). NCTC's data collection procedures are far better resourced and more professional than those employed previously by the State Department for its annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* reports. The NCTC dataset includes statistics for 2004, but these are not comparable to those for subsequent years and thus are not used in this chapter.
31. See MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 17 February 2008). Note that while MIPT has recorded data for 2007, the data are not complete and cannot therefore be used to make comparisons with data from earlier years or other datasets.
32. For details of the START dataset see <http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/> (accessed 17 February 2008).
33. US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 1984-2004), <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt> (accessed 17 February 2008).
34. MIPT, "TKB Data Methodologies," MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base website, <http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=method> (accessed 17 February 2008). Emphasis added.
35. NCTC and MIPT also allow dataset users to filter data in different ways.
36. MIPT, *The MIPT Terrorism Annual: 2006* (Oklahoma City, OK: MIPT, 2006), 54, <http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2008).
37. NCTC, *Annex of Statistical Information* (Undisclosed Location, VA: NCTC, 13 April 2007), 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83396.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2008).
38. Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, "'Misunderestimating' Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004), <http://www.krueger.princeton.edu/terrorism1.html> (accessed 17 February 2008).
39. NCTC's data still indicate a higher absolute number of fatalities than the other two datasets, but with a much less steep increase between 2005 and 2006 than shown in Figure 1.1.
40. MIPT does have data for 2007 but, according to MIPT, they were not complete at the time of writing. START had only published data up to December 2004.
41. General David Petraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," 10-11 September 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf> (accessed 14 February 2008). The statistics were collated from various sources by the US-led "Coalition in Iraq."
42. See MoveOn.org, "General Petraeus or General Betray Us?" <http://pol.moveon.org/petraeus.html> (accessed 14 February 2008), and Karen De Young, "Experts Doubt Drop in Violence in Iraq: Military Statistics Called into Question," *Washington Post*, 6 September 2007, sec. A p. 16.
43. Unlike NCTC and MIPT, Iraq Body Count's (IBC's) researchers make no attempt to distinguish between terrorist, sectarian, and insurgent killings of civilians. See <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.
44. See IBC, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/> (accessed 17 February 2008).
45. Carla Buckley and Michael R. Gordon, "US Says Attacks in Iraq Fell to Feb. 2006 Level," *New York Times*, 19 November 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/middleeast/19iraq.html?ex=1353128400&en=4e86cf9390494527&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss> (accessed 20 February 2008).
46. CNN, "Numbers Drop for Civilian Deaths, Foreign Fighters in Iraq," 2 December 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/02/iraq.death.toll/index.html?iref=topnews> (accessed 14 February 2008).
47. Ibid.

48. Petraeus, "Situation in Iraq," 1.
49. Damien Cave and Stephen Farrell, "At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup," *New York Times*, 9 September 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/world/middleeast/09surge.html?ex=1346990400&en=5d732c4254cadf37&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss> (accessed 21 February 2008).
50. Damien McElroy, "Moqtada al-Sadr Announces Ceasefire in Iraq," *Daily Telegraph*, 31 August 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/08/30/wiraq130.xml> (accessed 14 February 2008). The violence perpetrated by Sadrist militia fighters against fellow Shia had caused widespread revulsion against the militants within the wider Shia community.
51. Rod Norland, "A Radical Cleric Gets Religion," *Newsweek*, 19 November 2007, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/69572> (accessed 14 February 2008).
52. Cited in James Philipps, "Iraq Is a Strategic Battleground in the War against Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation, 11 September 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iraq/wm1210.cfm> (accessed 14 February 2008).
53. See Fredrick W. Kagan, "Al Qaeda in Iraq," *The Weekly Standard* 12, no. 48 (10 September 2007), <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/043delki.asp?pg=1> (accessed 14 February 2008). For a comprehensive but very different analysis of AQI see Andrew Tilghman, "The Myth of AQI," *Washington Monthly*, October 2007, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html> (accessed 14 February 2008).
54. See World Public Opinion.org, "All Iraqi Ethnic Groups Overwhelmingly Reject al Qaeda," 27 September 2006, <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/bmiddleeastnafricara/248.php?nid=&id=&pnt=248&lb=> (accessed 25 January 2008). The poll revealed that overall some 94 percent of Iraqis had an unfavourable view of al-Qaeda.
55. Gary Langer, "Iraqis' Own Surge Assessment: Fee See Security Gains," ABC News/BBC/NHK, 10 September 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3571504> (accessed 19 February 2008).
56. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7-48.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, 27.
60. See Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lost Small Wars," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-200, for an extended analysis of these issues.
61. Terrorism is least prevalent in strong states, while high levels of terrorist activity (attacks and fatalities) are strongly associated with failed states according to a recent study from the University of Maryland. However, whether state failure creates a permissive environment in which terrorism can flourish, or whether terrorism is a factor that causes states to fail is not clear from the study. See Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Susan Fahey, "Global Terrorism and Failed States," in *Peace and Conflict 2008*, ed. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008).
62. Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 43.
63. Abrahms defines acts of terrorism not as premeditated political violence against civilians or noncombatants, but rather as any violent attack—against military as well as civilian targets—perpetrated by groups that the US State Department has designated as terrorist organizations. Terrorism, from this perspective, is what terrorists do.
64. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is widely believed to have been behind the operation.

65. Patrick Cockburn, "Only One Thing Unites Iraqis: Hatred of the US," *The Independent*, 14 December 2007, <http://www.alternet.org/story/70656/> (accessed 14 February 2008).
66. MIPT and START use similar coding rules.
67. Doug Smith and Saif Rasheed, "Sects Unite to Battle Al Qaeda in Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 November 2007, <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-concerned19nov19,1,6630996.story?coll=la-headlines-frontpage&ctrack=5&cset=true> (accessed 20 January 2008). See also Bill Roggio, "Mapping Iraq's Concerned Local Citizens Programs," *The Long War Journal*, 12 December 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/mapping_the_concerne.php (accessed 19 February 2008).
68. Stephen Farrell and Solomon Moore, "Iraq Attacks Fall 60 Percent, Petraeus Says," *New York Times*, 30 December 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/world/middleeast/30iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 14 February 2008).
69. Jason Burke, "The Arab Backlash the Militants Didn't Expect," *The Observer*, 20 June 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/20/alqaida.terrorism> (accessed 20 February 2008).
70. Dalia Mogahed, "Understanding Islamic Democracy," *Europe's World* (Spring 2006), <http://www.gallup.com/consulting/worldpoll/26545/Understanding-Islamic-Democracy.aspx> (accessed 14 February 2008).
71. An Asia Foundation study of Muslims in Indonesia in 2003 found strong popular support for sharia law, but that respondents took this to mean a commitment to "the five pillars of Islam: prayer, belief in God, pilgrimage to Mecca, giving alms, and fasting during Ramadan." It did not translate into support for the repressive policies that the extremists advocate. Cited in Dan Murphy, "Poll: Muslims Only Show Partial Support for Al Qaeda's Agenda," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 April 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0425/p01s04-wome.html?page=1> (accessed 15 February 2008).
72. Mogahed, "Understanding Islamic Democracy," (accessed 14 February 2008).
73. Gary Langer, "2005 Poll: Four Years After the Fall of the Taliban, Afghans Optimistic about the Future," ABC News, 7 December 2005 <http://abcnews.go.com/International/PollVault/story?id=1363276> (accessed 19 February 2008).
74. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," April 2006, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf (accessed 19 February 2008).
75. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World: Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries*, 24 July 2007, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=257> (accessed 2 February 2008). The one exception to this global trend is found among Palestinians, 70 percent of whom support suicide bombings. However, there is a crucial difference between Palestinian suicide attacks and those of al-Qaeda and its affiliates—the Palestinian militants target Israelis; the majority of al-Qaeda's targets have been fellow Muslims. Israeli Muslims are sometimes killed in suicide attacks but, in sharp contrast to AQI's attacks on Iraqi Shia, the Palestinian attacks are not intended to kill fellow Arabs.
76. Terror Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public Opinion, *Saudi Arabians Overwhelmingly Reject Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Saudi Fighters in Iraq and Terrorism; Also among Most pro-American in Muslim World. Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Saudi Arabia*, December 2007, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimigestft/TFT%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Survey.pdf> (accessed 15 February 2008).
77. MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 14 February 2008).
78. ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD, *Afghanistan—Where Things Stand*, 3 December 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1049a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2008). 18.

79. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World*, (accessed 2 February 2008).
80. MIPT, "Incident Analysis Wizard," (accessed 17 December 2007).
81. Terror Free Tomorrow; The Center for Public Opinion, *Pakistani Support for Al Qaeda, Bin Laden Plunges; Moderate Parties Surge; 70 Percent Want President Musharraf to Resign: Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before the February 18th Elections*, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf> (accessed 11 February 2008). 5.
82. *Ibid*, 6.
83. *Ibid*, 3.
84. *Ibid*, 2.
85. See Kamran Bokhari, "The Jihadist Insurgency in Pakistan," *Terrorism Intelligence Report*, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, Inc., 6 February 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadist_insurgency_pakistan (accessed 19 February 2008).
86. Pew Project, *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood*, (accessed 2 February 2008).
87. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "The Iraq Effect: War Has Increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide," *Mother Jones*, 1 March 2007, http://www.motherjones.com/news/featurex/2007/03/iraq_effect_7.html (accessed 15 February 2008). MIPT draws on terrorist incidence and fatality data compiled by the RAND Corporation.
88. *Ibid*.
89. *Ibid*.
90. According to NCTC, fatalities in Afghanistan have been increasing unevenly since the beginning of 2005. NCTC, "Worldwide Incidents Tracking System," (accessed 4 January 2008).
91. We are talking here about a *net* decline in terrorist activity. In some areas—notably Pakistan and Afghanistan—jihadi attacks have been increasing.
92. Intelcenter, *Jihadi Attack Kill Statistics (JAKS) v. 1.8* (Alexandria, VA: Intelcenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC, 17 August 2007), <http://www.intelcenter.com/JAKS-PUB-v1-8.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2008); and Intelcenter, *Jihadi Ops Tempo Statistics (JOTS) v. 1.6* (Alexandria, VA: Intelcenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC, 20 July 2007), <http://www.intelcenter.com/JOTS-PUB-v1-6.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2008).
93. *Ibid*.
94. United States Government Accountability Office, *Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 30 January 2008), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08423r.pdf> (accessed 15 February 2008).
95. Victor Asal, Carter Johnson, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Ethnopolitical Violence and Terrorism in the Middle East," in *Peace and Conflict 2008*, ed. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008).
96. *Ibid*.
97. *Ibid*.

CHAPTER 2

98. Benjamin Coghlan et al., *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Ongoing Crisis* (New York: International Rescue Committee, January 2008).
99. UCDP; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. UCDP; Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
100. Lacina/Gleditsch Dataset, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat," 145-166.
101. Most datasets only count wars in which a state is one of the warring parties. The *Major Episodes of Political Violence* dataset compiled by Monty G. Marshall's Center for Systemic Peace is an exception. See <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm> (accessed 29 February 2008).
102. Genocides usually target civilians, but victims may also include military personnel.
103. The most commonly cited death toll figure is 800,000, but its provenance is unclear. It corresponds with UCDP's "high estimate." UCDP's "best estimate" is 500,000. In April 2004 the Rwandan government claimed that the death toll was almost 1 million. See Arthur Asiimwe, "Rwanda Census Puts Genocide Death Toll at 937,000," Reuters, Kigali, 4 April 2004, <http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/108117321274.htm> (accessed 29 February 2008).
104. Coghlan et al., *Mortality in the Congo*.
105. Data collected on indirect deaths outside the DRC, though fragmentary, suggest that the DRC may be unusual in that its war-driven mortality rates from disease and malnutrition remained elevated for more than four years after major fighting came to an end as a consequence of the 2002 peace agreement.
106. Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2007/2008* (Somerset, UK: Development Initiatives, February 2008). 15.
107. Strictly speaking, the UCDP/Human Security Report Project Terminations Dataset deals with the onset and termination of "conflict episodes." A given conflict can consist of a number of conflict episodes.
108. Polity IV Project at the Center for Systemic Peace, Virginia, <http://www.systemicpeace.org> (accessed 19 February 2008).
109. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, "Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility, 2008," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 18, no. 1 (January 2008): 3-21.
110. Data supplied by the University of Heidelberg's Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). Note that the number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the HIIK dataset is slightly different from that of the UCDP/Human Security Report Project dataset.
111. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Coup Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups d'Etat?" <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Coup-traps.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2008). 20.
112. Collier and Hoeffler, "Coup Traps," 13.
113. Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), University of Heidelberg.
114. Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, "Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record," *Journal of Democracy* 9.2 (1998): 134-147.
115. See http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm.
116. Princeton Lyman, "Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs," Washington, DC, United States Congress, 17 July 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13950/> (accessed 19 February 2008).
117. See the US State Department's "Background Notes," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn> (accessed 15 February 2008), and USAID's "USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation," <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/afr/countries/ne.htm> (accessed 15 February 2008).
118. See the World Bank's "World Development Indicators, 2007," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~isCURL:Y~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>.

119. The dataset was created by Professor Dr. Manuel Fröhlich of Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany. Only SRSGs who played a security role are counted here.
120. See "Africa's Peacekeeping Challenges in 2008," *Jane's Foreign Report, Jane's International Defence Review*, 21 January 2008, http://www4.janes.com/emeta/Denial?url=/subscribe/frp/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/frp/history/frp2008/frp70445.htm@current&Prod_Name=FREP&QueryText=&denial_reason=91996:4 (accessed 29 February 2008).
121. Teresa Whitfield, *Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, September 2007).

CHAPTER 3

122. This five-year period has been chosen because the data on non-state conflicts only go back to 2002.
123. Note that the UCDP/Human Security Report Project dataset is subject to an annual review and that estimates may change as more information becomes available. In the *Human Security Brief 2006* we reported that there were 31 state-based armed conflicts in 2005. This number has since been revised upwards to 32.
124. These conflicts were in Angola and Mozambique, both former Portuguese colonies.
125. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is coded as an interstate conflict. However, after Saddam Hussein was defeated and the Coalition forces started assisting the government in suppressing the subsequent insurgency, the conflict was coded as an internationalized intrastate conflict.
126. The other year in which the battle-death toll in Colombia dipped below the 1,000 mark was 2003.
127. Strictly speaking, the UCDP/Human Security Report Project terminations dataset deals with the onset and termination of "conflict episodes." A given conflict can consist of a number of conflict episodes.
128. Attentive readers may expect that, since the *Human Security Brief 2006* published conflict terminations data to 2005, the present *Brief* would update these data to 2006. The data in the present *Brief*, however, still end at 2005; this is a result of an adjustment made to coding practices for the conflict terminations data.
129. One exception is the dataset compiled by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace in Virginia.
130. This figure was arrived at by using "best estimates" from the UCDP/Human Security Report Project dataset and rounding to the nearest 1,000.
131. Although the final data are not yet available, it appears that the death toll in Afghanistan increased in 2007.
132. Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'État, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 339-370.
133. See *Conflict Barometer* (Heidelberg, Germany: HIIK, various dates). The data for this review were supplied by researchers at HIIK. Although the HIIK data go back to 1945, we have chosen our starting year as 1946. For ease of reference, we refer only to "coups" here, but readers should note that the data are for coups and attempted coups.
134. Private correspondence between HIIK and Human Security Report Project researchers, summer 2007.
135. Any coup or attempted coup in a colony is coded as having taken place in the colonial capital.
136. McGowan, "African Coups d'État," 345-346.
137. The HIIK dataset includes a number of countries that have populations of less than 500,000 and are therefore not included in the UCDP/PRIO, UCDP/Human Security Report Project, and Lacina/Gleditsch datasets.

CHAPTER 4

138. The HIIK dataset includes a number of countries that are not included in the UCDP/PRIO, UCDP/Human Security Report Project, and Lacina/Gleditsch datasets.
139. In a given year there can only ever be a single campaign of one-sided violence perpetrated by a particular actor—i.e., a government or non-state armed group. However, because there can be more than one non-state armed group in a particular country, it is possible to have two or more campaigns of one-sided violence in any one year.
140. The genocide and politicide dataset created by Barbara Harff focuses primarily on the killing of civilians but includes deaths of combatants. Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 57-73.
141. We focus on the 2002-2006 period here for two reasons. First, UCDP’s data are more reliable for this period than for the 1989-2001 period. Second, we want to be able to make comparisons with the non-state conflict trend data and these only extend back to 2002.
142. Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 233-246.
143. Most of the 200,000 people estimated to have died in Darfur have perished as a result of conflict-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. These deaths are not counted in the one-sided violence—or indeed any other—dataset.
144. See Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, *Political Terror Scale 1976-2006* (Asheville: University of North Carolina, 2007), <http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/> (accessed 16 February 2008).
145. See CIRI Human Rights Data Project, <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/> (accessed 16 February 2008). The acronym CIRI derives from the names of the dataset’s creators, David Cingranelli and David Richards.
146. The excerpted text is taken from the PTS, <http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.html> (accessed 16 February 2008), although the order of the levels has been reversed.
147. Gibney, Cornett, and Wood, *Political Terror Scale*, (accessed 16 February 2008).
148. There are 30 OECD countries and 26 LICUS countries. However, only 22 of the latter are included in the PTS data presented here.
149. Polity IV Project, (accessed 19 February 2008).
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. It may also be the case, as Christian Davenport and David Armstrong have argued, that “below certain values, the level of democracy has no discernable impact on human rights violations, but after a threshold has been passed ... democracy decreases state repression.” See Christian Davenport and David A. Armstrong II, “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2004): 538-554.
153. Note that while Figure 4.7 includes the Central African Republic, this country’s scores are not included in any of the other PTS data in the chapter because of missing scores during the 1980-2006 period.
154. A 2004 study showed that coverage of human rights issues in *The Economist* and *Newsweek* more than doubled between 1980 and 2000. See Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 79.
155. Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey, and Tanya C. Vazquez, “How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2001): 650-677.