Issue: January 2012

This joint study covering 17 countries in the Sahel and West Africa has two objectives: to analyze the historical climate trends in the region, identify hotspots and determine the potential implications for livelihoods which depend on natural resources; and to provide recommendations for improving conflict and migration sensitivity in adaptation planning, investments and policies across the region.

Using an innovative mapping process to analyze trends in temperature, rainfall, drought and flooding over the past 40 years, this report provides an important contribution to policy-makers and practitioners seeking to ground adaptation policies and investments in a sound understanding of the nature and scale of historical climate trends in the Sahel, and their impacts on livelihoods.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at least Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the Gulf area and the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most important difference between the two nations is that Saudi Arabia is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi’ite state whose senior politicians often view their country as the defender and natural leader of Shi’ites throughout the region. The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the politics of a number of regional states where these two powers exercise influence including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and others.

The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime protests known as the “Arab Spring” introduced new concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional priorities. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is therefore likely to intensify as a central feature in the Middle Eastern security landscape that reaches into both the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli theater. This is a reality that will touch upon the interests of the United States in a number of situations. In many instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a deeply anti-revolutionary state with values and priorities which sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic interest and often conflict over matters of reform and democracy for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, in seeking to support Middle Eastern stability, the United States must be prepared to mediate between Riyadh and Baghdad, and thereby help to limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into Iraqi politics.

At a time when much attention is focused on the Horn of Africa as one of Africa’s most war-ravaged regions and a continued source of security concern regionally and globally, this Discussion Paper provides deep insights into the complex dimensions of and linkages between the violent conflicts in the region. Delving into history and the core and contextual factors underpinning these wars in the postcolonial era, the author provides a conceptual framework for grappling with the complex inter- and intra-state conflicts by focusing on the institutional and structural causes of war. He goes on to make a compelling argument that conflict for institutional and democratic state transformation in the Horn of Africa is a fundamental step towards long-term peace and sustainable development.

Oppenheim, Ben A., Juan F. Vargas, and Michael Weintraub

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitment into an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While the literature on civilian victimization has expanded rapidly, few studies have examined the correlation between abuse of civilians and the modes of training that illegal armed actors receive. Using a simple formal model, we develop hypotheses regarding this connection and argue that while military training should not decrease the probability that a combatant engages in civilian abuse, political training should. We test these hypotheses using a new survey consisting of a representative sample of approximately 1,500 demobilized combatants from the Colombian conflict, which we match with department-level data on civilian casualties. The empirical analysis confirms our hypotheses about the connection between training and civilian abuse and the results are robust to adding a full set of controls both at the department and at the individual level.

Young, Laura A., and Korir Sing'Oei

In resource-scarce East Africa, minority groups face major challenges over the control of and access to land and natural resources. Minorities find themselves competing with other communities, with the state, and with corporate interests for control of resources upon which they depend for their livelihood, culture and future development. This report describes the situation of selected minorities and their neighbouring groups in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan’s Jonglei State. As globalization, population explosion, and climate change converge to increase the demand for land and other resources, these communities face extreme livelihood challenges, vulnerability to conflict, and ongoing discrimination.

The research for this report reveals that communities often struggle with multiple types of conflict at once: interethnic competition; conflict with the state; and conflict with corporate actors. Each of these types of conflict requires a different method of resolution. The report highlights that communities themselves are initiating the most effective conflict resolution methods when it comes to inter-ethnic violence, most often associated with cattle raiding in pastoralist communities. Effective conflict resolution strategies often draw on customary practices, integrated with modern technological advances. The report highlights that national law and policies often contradict and undermine customary practices. Moreover, current conditions of land scarcity, state intervention and resource extraction are straining or obliterating customary management in many communities.

Guantánamo continues to be a location for indefinite military incarceration and occasional military commission trials. There are individuals still detained who should be brought to justice on charges of responsibility in relation to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Currently, however, those accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks and other serious crimes face capital trial at Guantánamo before military commissions that do not meet international fair trial standards. Amnesty International urges the USA to close this detention facility and to adopt an approach to countering terrorism that incorporates full respect for its international human rights obligations.

Paddon, Emily, and Guillaume Lacaille

The brief considers the ‘stabilisation approach’ adopted by both the international community and national government to address the continued insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Considering stabilisation also offers a way of conceptualising and engaging with the root causes of displacement. Political implications of the stabilisation agenda are brought into sharper relief by focusing on a single question: stabilisation by whom and for whom? Rather than continuing to support the State unconditionally, the brief calls on international actors to strengthen and exercise their combined leverage in critical priority areas that together form a comprehensive ‘road map’ to long-term peace and stability following the elections.

Metcalfe, Vicki , Alison Giffen, and Samir Elhawary

For over two decades, the United Nations has sought to create greater coherence within the UN system. UN integration is part of this push - an attempt to maximise the impact of UN efforts to consolidate peace in conflict and post-conflict states.

The benefits and risks of UN integration for humanitarian action have been subject to intense debate. Some UN humanitarian staff, and many staff in non-UN humanitarian organisations, remain sceptical that UN integration can benefit humanitarian action. Many NGOs are opposed to UN integration, arguing that it blurs the distinction between humanitarian, military and political action and subordinates humanitarian priorities to political prerogatives. Conversely, many in the UN political and peacekeeping community stress the need for enhanced coherence and highlight the positive experiences of UN integration and the significant progress made in policy development and practice in recent years.

This independent study, carried out jointly by the Humanitarian Policy Group and the Stimson Center, was commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group to look in detail at the impacts of UN integration on humanitarian action. The study focused on three main case studies [Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia], and was complemented by a desk review of the Central African Republic, Darfur [Sudan] and Liberia. The study looked at the impact of UN integration arrangements on five areas of key humanitarian concern: humanitarian aid worker security, access to beneficiaries, engagement with non-state armed actors, perceptions of humanitarian actors and humanitarian advocacy.

As the recent upsurge of violence dramatically illustrates, the militias that were decisive in ousting Qadhafi’s regime are becoming a significant problem now that it is gone. Their number is a mystery: 100 according to some; three times that others say. Over 125,000 Libyans are said to be armed. The groups do not see themselves as serving a central authority; they have separate procedures to register members and weapons, arrest and detain suspects; they repeatedly have clashed. Rebuilding Libya requires addressing their fate, yet haste would be as perilous as apathy. The uprising was highly decentralised; although they recognise it, the local military and civilian councils are sceptical of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the largely self-appointed body leading the transition. They feel they need weapons to defend their interests and address their security fears.

A top-down disarmament and demobilisation effort by an executive lacking legitimacy would backfire. For now the NTC should work with local authorities and militias – and encourage them to work with each other – to agree on operational standards and pave the way for restructured police, military and civilian institutions. Qadhafi centralised power without building a central state. His successors must do the reverse.

Giustozzi, Antonio, and Claudio Franco

In early 2011, the attitude of the Taleban towards non-religious education came to the attention of the media because of a statement concerning a change in this attitude by Minister of Education Faruq Wardak. In reality, something had been fomenting long before that. This report was conceived in October 2010 and the project started in December, before Wardak’s foray. Between the end of 2009 and early 2010, while researching another paper on education in Afghanistan, one of the authors noticed negotiations going on at the local level in various parts of Afghanistan. Then during 2010, while researching another paper, "Insurgents of the Afghan North," the authors heard of the Taleban asserting their control over state schools in Kunduz. These hints that something was happening on the ground were enough to stimulate the authors’ attention, not least because of the view, already expressed in "Nation-Building Is Not for All" that control over education is a crucial aspect of any competition for political influence.

This paper therefore sets out to explore Taleban attitudes towards [non-religious] education in general and state education in particular, in greater depth than was possible in the first paper. The paper is based primarily on a series of interviews carried out by the authors between December 2010 and March 2011 with a mix of 82 Taleban, elders, teachers and informed people in 10 different provinces of Afghanistan. The informed people include tailors, shopkeepers and drivers, chosen by the field researchers because of their knowledge of local developments. Thirty-two of the 82 interviewees were Taleban commanders. Faryab, Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktika, Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman, Kunduz and Takhar provinces were chosen from areas having a significant Taleban presence as a sample representing the different regions of Afghanistan.

The central part of the report is dedicated to discussing evidence of negotiations around schools; the first section focuses on 2007–09 when the first indications emerged that something was going on. The second section takes the discussion to 2010–11. In a separate sub-section, we discuss what motivated the Taleban’s change of strategy; we also discuss separately the Taleban demands for a compromise. The last section looks at hints of the debate within the Taleban of what the future of education in Afghanistan could be.

This Discussion Paper provides a profound analysis of the theory of democratisation as applied in a post-conflict West African context. It includes a compelling analysis of ‘democratisation without development’ in Guinea-Bissau and lays the groundwork for what is to be done to facilitate democratic transformation in the country. This is a must-read for scholars, policy and development practitioners and activists keen on understanding the immediate background to the current challenges facing Guinea-Bissau and their possible resolution.

This ASPI Strategy paper argues that with or without al‑Qaeda as a coherent organisation at the vanguard of the global Islamist movement, religiously motivated terrorism is set to continue for many decades to come. Despite the obvious splintering and factionalisation within al‑Qaeda and between al‑Qaeda and its various franchises and affiliates, there’s no evidence that ‘al‑Qaedaism’ as a motivating ideology is going to dissolve any time soon.

The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 examines the ideological foundations of the current fourth wave of global terrorism. Chapter 3 looks at how that ideology has been operationalised, and the emerging debate between those who continue to advocate a structured, ‘organisational’ jihad and the new generation who see individuals, ‘freelancers’ or small groups as the more appropriate framework for conducting global terrorism. These various strands of modern jihadism (decentralisation, localisation and individualisation) shouldn’t be viewed as contradictory—and al‑Qaeda, through prominent individuals such the now-deceased American‑born preacher Anwar al‑Awlaki in Yemen, has advocated multiple strategies to attack the West. Chapter 4 discusses the shifting geography of terrorism, including the importance of South Asia and the rise of al‑Qaeda‑related groups in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Chapter 5 examines the extent of recent terrorist innovation in weapons and tactics, and the possibility that al‑Qaeda will acquire and use non‑conventional weapons.

Chapter 6 draws on this analysis to sketch out the elements of a more effective counterterrorism strategy for Australia in a post‑bin Laden world. The centrepiece of that strategy must be a more robust and better resourced effort to confront the spread of extremist ideology, both at home and abroad. Current government efforts towards countering violent extremism are commendable, but should concentrate on those areas most at risk of radicalisation—individuals, institutions and the internet. And, instead of seeking a ‘peace dividend’ from Osama bin Laden’s death, Australia will need to work even more closely with Southeast Asian governments, particularly Indonesia, in combating the spread of Islamist extremism in our own region.