PIRACY: Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies
Beginning in the early 1980s, commercial shipping became a prime target of pirates, first off West Africa and then slowly spreading into Southeast Asia. Throughout the 1990s, and especially after the Soviet Union’s collapse, piracy increased dramatically. Reports of piracy tripled during 1991–2001: of 335 reported cases in 2001, ninety-one were in waters claimed by Indonesia, twenty-seven by India, twenty-five by Bangladesh, nineteen by Malaysia, eight by Vietnam, and eight by the Philippines; another seventeen reported attacks occurred in the Malacca Strait, bordering on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. This monograph is intended as a contribution to both scholarship and professional naval thinking; it is an academic and comparative examination of twelve selected case studies from maritime history used to illuminate a range of concepts and uses of piracy suppression. The twelve case studies provide the basis for the conclusions, an approach that provides a more thorough understanding of the uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context of new maritime technologies and within a wider range of modern national policy goals than might otherwise be achievable. Above all, this collection provides a sound basis for comparative analysis of varying historical experiences that can stimulate new and original thinking about a basic but often overlooked naval duty. United States Naval War College // Newport Papers (31 January 2010)
SOMALIA: Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008 and threatens to disrupt international trade and could potentially become a weapon of international terrorism. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar ransom payments and their operations are become increasingly sophisticated. The pirates have improved their equipment and now use GPS systems and satellite phones giving them a greater ability to capture potential targets. The danger of piracy could mean shipping is forced away from the Gulf of Aden into the longer route to Europe and North America. The extra weeks of travel and fuel consumption could have a major impact on oil and commodity prices. The paper also argues that Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab. In a region that saw the attacks on the USS Cole, the possibility of seaborne terrorism should be taken seriously. As a result of piracy, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been forced to temporarily suspend food deliveries to drought-stricken Somalia. Canada is now escorting WFP deliveries but there are no plans in place to replace their escort when it ends later this year. In this paper, Roger Middleton, outlines a number of options available to the international community to reduce the risks of piracy but stresses that ignoring the problem is not one of them. Only a political solution in Somalia offers a long-term solution to piracy. Chatham House (1 October 2008)
AFRICA: Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa
There were 115 reported pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2008. Of those attacks, 46 resulted in the seizure of a commercial vessel by Somali pirates. The average ransom for the release of hijacked vessels increased from $1 million US dollars in July of 2008, to $1.5 million by December. At the time of writing 12 vessels are being held along with approximately 400 crew members in pirate towns along Somalia’s unlawful coasts. The Gulf of Aden (GOA), where most of the attacks have occurred, and through which 20,000 commercial vessels transit each year, is slowly being choked off as a viable shipping route. More and more shipping companies are opting to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk an attack or a hijacking, and insurance rates for vessels transiting the GOA have increased ten-fold in the last four months. Despite the increased presence of warships in the region, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and along Somalia’s eastern coast is escalating and will get worse before it gets better. This article looks at the issue of contemporary maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa from a strategic perspective. It seeks to understand the crucial variables involved in order to predict how the issue will evolve. Accordingly, it should be of use to both scholars and citizens seeking a deeper understanding of the issue, as well as those with commercial interests being affected by Somali piracy. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (15 December 2008)
SOMALIA: Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy
The upsurge in attacks by Somali pirates between 2005 and mid-2009 reflects decades of political unrest, maritime lawlessness and severe economic decline. Piracy has dire implications for economic development and political stability in Somalia, with economic prospects constrained, business confidence compromised and human security worsening. It could also have a destabilizing effect on global trade and security unless immediate steps are taken to craft a coordinated strategy to address the complex factors that trigger and sustain crime and impunity on the high seas. However, poorly designed and implemented strategies could inadvertently strengthen the hand of extremists in and around Somalia. The Somali authorities and their international partners should plan for a sustained application of 'smart power' by all stakeholders. This paper offers practical strategies to mitigate the rising costs of Somali piracy and lay the foundation for lasting peace. United States Institute of Peace (31 July 2009)
GOVERNANCE: The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea
This article attempts to analyze piracy through the perspective of political economy, with an emphasis on state and market stakeholders and on the economic, technological, and institutional factors affecting ocean governance of piracy. The major area of concern here is the South China Sea, where approximately half of the world’s reported incidents of piracy have taken place since the 1990s. Following the usage of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), this estimate includes instances of both piracy as defined under international law—theft on the high seas—and armed robbery or theft in the territorial waters or ports of coastal states. This article will examine the scope and trends in piracy in the South China Sea as well as the factors that motivate this form of maritime crime. It continues with an analysis of the factors that impede antipiracy efforts, including uncertainties over definitions and legal jurisdiction, the underlying dynamics of piracy, and uncoordinated efforts at detection, pursuit, arrest, and conviction of pirates as well as recovery of crew, cargo, or ships. It concludes with an analysis of the limited progress made by state and market stakeholders to improve antipiracy security in the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea. National War College Review // United States Naval War College (1 August 2009)
SOMALIA: For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol: A Strategic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Challenge
If measures against pirates are to be effective, they must be carried out on land. Pirates are criminals who can best be thwarted by eliminating their bases and networks. At sea, it is only possible to treat the symptoms of piracy and catch the small fish. This report focuses on the pirates off the coast of Somalia as this is where the problem has spread dramatically, and as Denmark has been extensively involved in combating piracy in the area around the Horn of Africa. Strategies with three time horizons can be developed for combating pirates: short-term, medium-term, long-term. To date, a large number of states has become involved in combating piracy at a rapid pace, and the steps they have taken have therefore been characterised by a short-term time horizon. The aim of this report is to present recommendations that can function in the medium term. This means that temporary measures such as convoying or stationing soldiers on board merchant ships have not been taken into consideration. It is not realistic to maintain such operations for a longer period of time. Nor is there any attempt in the report to find a solution to the civil war in Somalia – something that would otherwise help to solve the problem of piracy in the long term. Dansk Institut for Militaere Studier // Danish Institute for Military Studies (1 March 2009)
GOVERNANCE: Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns
Piracy in the Straits of Malacca is a large and growing concern for the world. Not only does it cause economic havoc in a critical region, but this piracy may also have connections to terrorism and has the potential to cause an ecological disaster. However, attempts by outside states to establish security regimes have repeatedly run into sovereignty concerns from the coastal states in the region: Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. Instead of persisting in this failed strategy of externally imposed solutions, interested parties should focus on aiding the creation of an internal security regime through aid and logistical support. Building the capacity of the local navies to patrol the region is the most acceptable and effective solution towards ending piracy in the long run. Stanford Journal of International Relations // Stanford University (31 May 2009)
PIRACY: High Noon on the High Seas: A Proximity–Complexity Model of Maritime Piracy Threats
An apparent contradiction between rhetorical claims of piracy threats to international shipping and actual attack trends has established the need for a more structured approach to strategic risk assessment. This article provides new insight into risk assessment methodologies by integrating a structured, multi-dimensional approach to attack profiling within a more comprehensive Proximity–Complexity model. This model was empirically examined by conducting a comparative risk assessment in two regions widely cited as high risk, the Straits of Malacca in Asia and the coastal waters of Nigeria. Results indicate that the consideration of geographic proximity of attacks as a risk factor may need to be more carefully examined. Further, the authors suggest that counter-piracy strategies could benefit from a multi-stage risk assessment methodology that integrates both structured and geographic approaches within a more comprehensive analytic framework. Center for Contemporary Conflict (14 April 2009)
SOMALIA: Effectively Confronting a Regional Threat: Somali Piracy
The Somali piracy threat is not yet over. Vessels are still being attacked, warships from more than a dozen nations are on station, and some crews are taking alternate routes to avoid the Horn of Africa. But a promising trend is emerging, both in the waters and diplomatically, to confront this maritime crime. In January 2009, of 18 piracy attempts, only three were successful. In 2008, however, Somali pirates achieved considerably better results, boarding about a third of the ships they attacked. The recent positive developments come on the heels of a surge in piracy not seen in generations. Many years from now, the period November 2008 to January 2009 will be remembered as the decisive months in the battle to defeat Somali pirates.[...]Piracy often occurs when there is poverty and a weak or non-existent government. Maritime crime spiked off the Somali coast in 2008, in part because of the dire economic situation within that country. But the recent events were the culmination of years of inattention, desperation and lawlessness occurring in an area bordering a globally vital shipping route. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes // Conflict Trends Issue #1 2009 (1 March 2009)
US: The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States
Seven main factors have contributed to the general emergence of piracy in the contemporary era. First and most fundamentally, there has been a massive increase in commercial maritime traffic. Combined with the large number of ports around the world, this growth has provided pirates with an almost limitless range of tempting, high-payoff targets. Second is the higher incidence of seaborne commercial traffic that passes through narrow and congested maritime chokepoints. These bottlenecks require ships to significantly reduce speed to ensure safe passage, which dramatically heightens their exposure to midsea interception and attack. Third, and specifically relevant to Southeast Asia, has been the lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis. Not only did this event exert a stronger 'pull factor' on piracy—with more people (including members of the security forces) drawn to maritime and other crime— it also deprived many littoral states of the necessary revenue to fund effective monitoring regimes over their coastlines. Fourth, the general difficulties associated with maritime surveillance have been significantly heightened as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and the concomitant pressure that has been exerted on many governments to invest in expensive, land-based homeland security initiatives. Fifth, lax coastal and port-side security have played an important role in enabling low-level piratical activity, especially harbor thefts of goods from ships at anchor. Sixth, corruption and emergent voids of judicial prerogative have encouraged official complicity in high-level pirate rings, which has impacted directly on the 'phantom ship' phenomenon. Seventh, the global proliferation of small arms has provided pirates (as well as terrorists and other criminal elements) with an enhanced means to operate on a more destructive and sophisticated level. RAND Corporation (9 June 2008)
SOMALIA: Privatising the Fight against Somali Pirates
The recent audacious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa have fuelled the debate about the privatisation of maritime security. Ship owners and maritime security experts, as well as representatives of industry organisations, have stated that private security companies may be able to ensure safe passage for vessels through these pirate infested waters, a task at which government agencies have failed, despite international efforts. In fact, with more than 35 hijacked vessels this year, the first hijacking of a super tanker, attacks on UN aid ships and the unprecedented payment of millions of US dollars ransom for kidnapped crew and hijacked vessels, the arguments for hiring PSCs are strong. However, the employment of PSCs in Iraq and other places around the world has clearly shown that there are problems associated with the services provided by PSCs and the regulation of such companies in conflict zones. This paper explores the risks and benefits of employing PSCs to secure shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. Asia Research Centre // Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia (15 November 2008)
PIRACY: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy
Piracy is an old problem which is now again attracting attention, mainly because of the surge of pirate attacks off the coasts of Somalia. Closer analysis shows the problem to be of quite modest proportions. The international naval protection of merchant shipping holds out some prospects of containing the problem, but it is most likely to solve itself. If international shipping opts for the route south of Africa, piracy will die out for a lack of targets. Maritime terrorism is, likewise, a problem of very limited proportions. It is often conflated with piracy, but there are significant differences between the two phenomena, the latter being undertaken for selfish reasons, the former for the sake of some higher cause. Whereas it is conceivable that maritime terrorists will gradually transform themselves into pirates, a transformation in the opposite direction is well nigh inconceivable. Besides the analysis of these two phenomena, the overlap between them and certain naval strategies are also briefly touched upon. Danish Institute for International Studies (15 February 2009)